As recounted in previous posts in «Life on the High Seas» I spent the first years of my early youth in the merchant navy – just after WW2. Then, 15-year olds were allowed as deck boys, mess boys, galley boys, wipers etc. I served on various ships betwen 1946 and 1951. By the 1950ies, Norway’s merchant fleet was the World’s fourth largest, crewed by 35,000 seamen – 90% of then Norwegians.
Burial at sea
By 1949 I had come to serve on the 12,800 ton (dw) tanker ”Trondheim” (Hjalmar Bjørge, owners). She was built at Eriksbergs in Gothenburg in 1939, with a 3600 hp two-stroke, double-acting Burmeister & Wain diesel engine.
Motor tanker «Trondheim»
The «Trondheim” had an impressive war history: from 1941 to 1945 she served continuously in convoys between the US and the UK, carrying gasoline and kerosene, chalking up over 30 two-way trips across the pond, escaping unhurt. January 1946 she was returned to her owners and served them until 1952, when she was sold to Italy – she was scrapped in 1965.
At the time I served on her, we mostly plied between Abadan in the Persian Gulf and North European destinations, carrying light fuel oil. In August, however, we made a return trip Abadan-Aden: a 9-day trip each way. One of my 40 shipmates was an 18 year old mess boy – let me call him Kjell. 5 days out of Abadan he came to play the lead part of a four-act drama:
Act 1:
Kjell suddenly became ill. He developed high fever and became delirious. One thigh swelled up and became discoloured. The captain radioed a nearby Pakistani passenger ship out of Karachi, the Muhammadi Line’s S/S “Al Ahmadi” (as I remember), who had a doctor on board. She made a short detour, and her doctor was put over to us in a launch.
Act 2:
The doctor (who was British) examined Kjell, who was unconscious – he quickly determined that it was too late – Kjell died an hour later. We were told (I cannot vouch for the veracity of this) that Kjell had lied about his diabetes (which would have prevented him from serving at sea), and that he had brought a supply of insulin and syringes, and that by accident, a needle had broken inside his thigh.
Act 3:
Our captain radioed Aden’s harbour authorities (Aden was still British at the time) informing them that we had a corpse on board, to bury on shore. Aden authorities blankly refused – no corpse to be put ashore in Aden! So, it became a burial at sea – the only one I have experienced.
Act 4:
Kjell’s body was sewn into a Norwegian flag with weights, and placed on a board on top of the lower deck railing. Engine stopped, the “Trondheim” drifted slowly in the long, lazy swells, there was just a waft of a breeze. We were at 18 N and 59 E, the Indian Ocean was intensely blue, the water crystal clear – depth is 3700 metres there.
We stood around in a semi circle, bare headed, the captain recited the Lord’s Prayer, the board was tipped over, and Kjell disappeared into the clear, blue deep – flag and all. It was a solemn moment, one of those that etch into memory.
PS: Traditionally, the corpse should have been sewn into a weighted canvas shroud and the flag attached to the board, to remain on board. Making the arrangements, however, our carpenter didn’t like that idea – he felt the boy was worth a flag. So did the captain.
Human development is accelerating exponentially: 10 million years of human existence enabled us to develop societies; 10 thousand years of living i societies enabled us to discover science; 100 years of science enabled us to make weapons that can wipe us all out in seconds.
The forces of these weapons far exceed our ability to control them. Thus, humanity cannot save itself, and the end is very close.
In a cosmic perspective this does not really matter. Compared to Earth’s 4.6 billion year existence, the existence of human societies is like a short rash on the surface of the Earth. Once human kind disappears, Earth will go on as before, slowly developing new life forms, just as it did once before, 251 million years ago …
The Earth is 4.6 billion years old. Some unicellular life emerged 3.8 billion years ago, but remained unicellular for the next 3.2 billion years, until the first multicellular organisms appeared as aquatic organisms about 600 million years ago. About 450 million years ago, organisms on land emerged in the form of plants and fungi followed by arthropods. Amphibiansappeared 360 million years ago.
A notable event happened at the close of the Permian period 251 million years ago: 90 % of all life on the planet was wiped out. That did not prevent life from reappearing – within 10 million years, life proliferated again during the Triassic period (the dinosaurs). Birds appeared around 150 million years ago, mammals around 130 million years ago, homininaeabout 10 million years ago, developing into humans.
Humans have two characteristics that separate them from all other beings:
They walk upright on two legs
The thumb enables a firm grip and hold.
Moving around on two legs freed the remaining two extremities – the arms – to use for other purposes than moving the body, and the grip enabled humans to handle objects. These physical differences enabled man to develop two abilities unavailable to other species:
The ability to make, use and improve tools
The ability to start and control fire
These developments took some time: Walking on two legs started 2.8 million years ago, the use of stone tools has been dated to 2.6 million years ago. Both of these were in place before the thumb developed about 1.8 million years ago.
From the earliest times, homo erectus was a flock animal, living in small groups and families. During 1.7 million years following the appearance of the thumb, humans developed into homo habilis by slowly improving their ability to utilise their hand grips and their tool use, without any particular breakthroughs. Then, about 400,000 years ago, a three-phase development started:
Phase I started with man acquiring the ability to control fire.
That led to changes in human behaviour: Fire provided warmth, which made it possible for man to compensate for low temperatures, and light, no longer limiting human activity to daylight hours. Thus, fire permitted humans to move down from the trees to the ground, made them less dependent on climate and on daylight.
Humans took to living mainly in caves; however, the process of changing abilities and behaviour took about 150,000 years. There followed another 100,000 years, during which humans continued to develop their tools and their use of fire. This gradually led to further changes: the use of heat to process protein-rich food made it easier to digest, changing the human diet. Also, over time, the use of fire for heating led to humans developing much less body hair.
Phase II started about 130 000 years before our time.
Humans became more mobile, developed means of expression other than sounds, like cave paintings, they moved out of caves, gradually transforming into the nomadic life of hunters/gatherers. They developed more advanced tools and ways to use them. The diet change by heat treatment of food led to the teeth of homo habilis becoming smaller. Man developed more organised ways of living, in the form of extended families and tribes.
Phase III started about 15 000 years ago.
By then, man had been able to control fire for nearly 400,000 years, to use advanced tools for about 300,000 years, and had been largely nomadic for 100,000 years. In the third phase, man started to band together in larger groups, establishing large tribes, and started keeping some animals in controlled herds.At this time, man further developed means of communicating – like carved signs.
About 10,000 years ago, man commenced cultivation and improvement of food plants – agriculture – and expansion of the husbanding of the most important animal types. This form of food production gradually replaced hunting and gathering, and led to allocation of defined areas for growing food and raising animals, and building of dwellings in groups. Means of communicating developed into stored writing. Man developed forms of distributing tasks between specialised groups of people,
This led to territorial claims of ownership of certain areas and their products. Since man’s propensity for seizing the products of other peoples’ labour is as old as mankind itself, it became necessary to guard and defend such assets against unwanted intrusion. Consequently, groups and tribes started to pool their areas and interests, creating states.
The driving force during this last phase was the increasing recognition of the fact that humans were strongest when many acted together, and of how working in specialised groups led to much more efficient production methods and techniques. These greatly increased efficiencies led to two forms of surplus:
Quantities of food and other necessities were produced in excess of what was needed for own use
Work capacity became available for other purposes.
Surplus of some goods led to their exchange against goods which were needed, with others groups who had different surplus goods – that is how trade started. A natural consequence of trade was the ensuing need for transport and for means of transport.
Part of the surplus work capacity went into defence: Erection of walls, gates and moats to protect against attacks – some such defense structures are known from prehistoric times. As time went on, building techniques improved and made it possible to build structures for other purposes.
One would think that primitive societies would use their surplus work capacity to improve their material well being. Not so: spiritual well being overrode the need for creature comfort, so that until as recently as 300 years ago, public structures – apart from pure defense works – consisted mostly of temples, mausoleums and places of worship: Abstract purposes – gods, worship and the dead (with the notable exception of the Roman Empire), It took science and technology and the ensuing rapid economic expansion to force the focus over to practical purposes.
Considering that it took
4 billion years from planet Earth came into being (4.6 billion m.y.a.) before multi-celledorganisms appeared, followed by another
600 million years of life crawling around in the seas, subsequently proceeding to crawl up on dry land, before the first signs appear of Hominidiae, and then
5 million years of Hominidiae developing through several primitive forms until one type (Homo erectus) started walking on two legs, subsequently developing the thumb, then
4 million years living with two extremities freed to use for other purposes and a thumb permitting a firm grip (separating humans from all other species) until humans managed to make and control fire, then
400 000 years, using fire and developing tools until they commenced managing plants and animals, thereby creating Agriculture and extracting metals from ore and soil, then
9500 years of using metals and tools and organising into societies before they invented Gunpowder, and
500 years of using gunpowder until they managed to create the Nuclear Bomb,
30 years using nuclear energy until Electronic Data Processing was universally available, and
less than 20 years of universal use of electronic data processing until we have reached today’s Total Electronic Communication and surveillance,
a picture appears of an exponentially accelerating pace of development.
Which leads to the conclusion that total self destruction is very, very near – and that there is no indication that the human race will manage to save itself. The cause is clear indeed: The human race has developed materials and technology that can totally destroy mankind in the blink of an eye (not environment or ecology, but explosives and radioactivity). These forces far exceed the ability of humanity to control them.
If you present the Earth’s 4.6 billion year existence as compressed into one year, the 10 million years of hominiae existence on earth would show up as the last 19 minutes of that year, and the existence of human societies as one minute and 9 seconds: a one minute rash on the surface of the Earth.
After the disappearance of hominiae – human kind – the Earth will go on as before, slowly developing new (and different) life forms, entering a new cycle of generation of life – just as it did 251 million years ago …
(This story became an international media sensation that, at the time, was spread all over the world as a curiosity news item. 15 years later (1994) the Norwegian TV channel TV3 re-enacted the incident with flying, jumping and interviews, in a program called «Alarmen går»).
A large part of my life I have been actively engaged in skydiving – throughout the 70’ies I was very active. I also acquired a pilot’s licence (PPL) – someone had to fly us to exit altitude. We created the ”Nimbus” Skydiving Club at Rygge Air Force Base (RNoAF) just south east of Oslo, and after a few years, the club had acquired two jump aircraft: One Cessna 182 (LN-TSB) and one Cessna 206 (LN-IKC).
Sunday December 11th, 1977:
Nimbus scheduled training jumps every weekend before Christmas, despite the cold and the short days. This Sunday it was about 5 degrees below zero (C), a light but ice cold southerly breeze and overcast at 5000 feet. During the night there had been a light snowfall, less than two inches. The students from our latest training course lined up at Rygge AFB at 1300 hrs (i.e. after church hours, it being a Sunday).
Usually I jumped myself, but this particular day it was my turn to fly the jump aircraft – Nimbus’ aircraft number 2, Cessna 206 LN-IKC. The low ceiling dictated student training only, and as load number four I got jumpmaster Arne Husby and five static line students – he planned to send them off one by one, then make a 360 climbing turn, and jump on a last run.
At Nimbus, our student rigs were modified B-5 emergency parachutes with 28 foot C9 canopies and double-T (Hustler) steering mod. The opening system was static line with cotton break cords closing the container. A PCA – pilot chute assist system – a short web piece with a male velcro piece attached, was tied to the end of the static line, paired with a piece of female velcro attached to the pilot chute inside the pack.
The static lines were attached to a point of the cabin floor. IKC had a ring in the floor behind the pilot’s seat for the static line hooks – all lines were hooked to the same ring, and all lines were hooked up when loading, one by one. When exiting, the line was stretched out, the break cords broke, the pca pulled the pilot chute out of the slipstream, ensuring a fast opening of the main canopy.
IKC had, like most 206es – a large cargo door at the rear of the cabin on the right hand side, so that students had no wing strut to hold on to, nor any step to use – exiting students had to sit in the door half out, legs dangling, and then push off on the jumpmaster’s order ”Go!”
Arne Husby – the photo was taken two weeks later, during the re-enactment of the incident.
We took off as normal, climbing to exit altitude 2500 feet. Arne directed me with”left-right”-signs, then placed student number one in the door and ordered ”Go!”. Once the student was away and a normal opening was observed, Arne coiled up the static line (with the pca piece at the end) and shoved it under my seat. New run in, next student, same procedure, in the end there were five static lines stowed under my seat. One last 360 turn and we were at 3500, Arne crouched in the door until we were lined up – gave me a short wave and disappeared. I drew back on the throttle to start the descent.
Suddenly, I hear shouting – and it was not in my headset – but I am alone up here! I look behind me – empty plane – but one of the static lines lies tightly across the floor and out at the rear bottom corner of the door. Suddenly I get a bad feeling, I kick hard right rudder and bank right – and there I see Arne dangling about 15 feet below, hanging by one leg at the end of a static line. I trim the plane. unfasten my seat belt and go behind my seat to see if the static line can be unhooked – but No Way! – it is as taut as a bowstring!
Back in my seat, I call up RY Tower and explain that I have a jumper hanging head down 15 feet under my plane. The air traffic controller (ATC officer Einar Solum) responds with the key words (which I will never forget): What are your intentions?” That started my thought processes – What Now?
It was getting dark (it was the last load of the day), under me I had Rygge’s 2400 metre concrete runway, an 1800 metre parallel runway and 2000 metres of taxiways, to my left I had the large lake Vannsjø, frozen. It was clear to me that I could not land on the concrete surfaces with Arne hanging underneath; he would be killed (in the blinding light of hindsight a landing on the concrete might have worked out). Regardless, I had to land.
But where? The ice on Vannsjø was new and most likely too thin to carry a ton of aircraft – besides; a landing in ice water would create a new problem. My biggest worry initially was about what Arne might do – if the pulled his main or reserve, one of two things would happen: His leg would be pulled off (killing him), or the plane would be stopped in the air and fall down (killing us both). After a while the shouting stopped, and I was relieved – it led me to believe (and hope) that Arne had fainted (he had not – more about that later).
Eilif December 1977
Once again, I was helped by the air traffic controller, who said”What about landing on the grass between the runway and the taxiway?”. Sure, that would be much softer, there was the added padding of the light snow cover, and the landing space was generous. So, I decided: Land between the taxiway and Runway 30 – and land at as low a speed as possible.
IKC happened to be perfectly suited for such an operation: its configuration was ideal, with very large flaps, powerful engine (285 hp), very low weight, as it was empty but for Arne and myself, and the fuel tanks were only a quarter full. I lined up north of the field at 3000 feet, aiming at the landing spot, and commenced a long, long approach, gradually reducing airspeed by increasing flaps, pulling up the nose while adding power ending up about 20 inches MP.
The airspeed crept steadily downward as I approached the landing area, but IKC remained rock stable and the stall warning kept mysteriously quiet. Towards the end, the airspeed indicator was well under stall speed, but the engine kept us flying – like hanging on the prop. Just before touchdown, there was a narrow concrete road crossing over to an instrument hut – when we closed in I reduced power just a little, but IKC reacted like a brick, so I gave it a power burst to get us over the crossing road.
Firm landing! – we are down! I step hard on the brakes and cut the engine, release my seat belt and jump out of the cargo door – and there lies Arne, shouting to me:”I am fine, fine – I’m completely OK!”. I refuse to believe this (I’m thinking maybe a broken back) and tell him: “Lie still, don’t move! – wait for the ambulance!”. ATC had punched the emergency button much earlier, so the ambulance was right there. We hooked off his gear and untied the static line from his leg (the pca had taken a turn around his leg and the male velcro had attached to his jumpsuit leg), put him carefully over on the stretcher, and off to the infirmary with him.
I paced up the aircraft wheel tracks and the trail Arne had made in the snow. The wheel tracks left by IKC measured 35 metres – the drag trail left by Arne was 70 metres – 230 feet – believe it or not. He had dragged 35 metres (115 feet) on the ground while the aircraft was still in the air – braking its speed.Then came the best part: Half an hour later Arne came back from the infirmary – the doctor had found nothing wrong with him, apart from a sore ankle – happy end!
Front Page of the Norwegian pictorial magazine NA, 24 December 1977
Then, publicity took off – somebody called one of the country’s most notorious news rag, VG. They had an artist draw a picture of the incident (all wrong, with the door on the wrong side of the aircraft) but the sensation was there. The various press agencies picked it up, and the story went world wide as a news item – I received messages and congratulations from near and far, including Australia and the USA. National Enquirer sent a journalist to Oslo to interview me. Then came the pictorial “Nå“ and wanted to do a re-enactment with Arne jumping again, which we arranged with the IKC plus a chase plane and did it again – except for the hanging head down.. The report in Nå! was six full pages.
15 years later, in 1994, the Norwegian TV network TV3 made a program about the incident as part of a series called “Alarmen går”, interviewing both Arne and me, and doing the flying with another 206 owned by Stavanger skydiving club, featuring their skydivers.
Afterthoughts:
There are sides of this story that I have shared only with select people over the years – basically the decision process: Once I had decided to land on the grass, a slow, slow landing was my only objective. I pushed away any thought of what, at that moment, appeared to me as a certainty: Arne would be killed. Behind that lurked another, built in question:
Is my decision the only solution? What happens when I land, having killed Arne, and everybody asks: ”Why didn’t you do that or that i stead, and you would have saved him?” – and that there would be some other, obvious action that would have saved his life, a possibility I had not seen or understood …
As it happened, such a situation did not occur – what I did was right, and everything turned out well – he survived – but the awful feeling of ”what if” still bothers me …
When Arne and I finally got to sit down face to face and talk the whole thing over, Arne tells me calmly: “No, I wasn’t really scared – I kept thinking that it is Eilif who is flying, he has years of experience, knows what he is doing, is steady as a rock, and all will turn out just fine!”
(Denne historien ble til en mediasensasjon som gikk over hele verden som nyhetssnutt – 15 år senere (1994) lagde TV3 en rekonstruksjon med intervjuer, flyging og hopping – «Alarmen går» … )
En stor del av mitt liv har jeg vært engasjert i fallskjermhopping – gjennom hele 70-tallet var jeg svært aktiv. Flysertifikat ble det også, for noen måtte jo fly oss opp.
Vi skapte Fallskjermklubben Nimbus med base på Rygge Flystasjon, og klubben kjøpte etter hvert to fly: En Cessna 182 LN-TSB og en Cessna 206 LN-IKC.
Søndag 11. desember 1977
Nimbus hadde som vanlig treningshopping de siste helgene før jul –, til tross for kulde og korte dager. Denne søndagen var ca. 5 kuldegrader, lett, men iskald sydlig bris og det hadde snødd lett (3-4 cm) om natten. Det var overskyet i 5000 fot, noe som passet vårt siste elevkurs. De stilte på vårt faste hoppfelt Rygge Flystasjon denne dagen kl 1300 (dvs., etter kirketid, fordi det var søndag).
Vanligvis hoppet jeg selv, men denne dagen var det min tur til å fly Nimbus’ klubbmaskin nummer 2, Cessna 206 LN-IKC. Med det lave skydekket ble det bare elevhopping, og som fjerde løft lastet jeg inn hoppmester Arne Husby med fem lineelever – han skulle sette dem ut i tur og orden, så skulle vi ta en 360 climbing turn, og Arne hoppe til slutt.
De fallskjermene vi brukte i Nimbus was modifiserte B-5 nødskjermer med 28 fots C9 kalotter med dobbel-T (Hustler) styresystem. Åpningssystemet var utløserline (static line) med brytetråder som holdt pakksekken lukket. En PUTT (pilotskjermuttrekker) – en kort webstropp forsynt med et stykke han-velcro var knyttet til enden på utløserlinen, paret med et stykke hun-velcro på toppen av pilotskjermen som lå inne i sekken.
Staticlinene ble huket fast i flyet bak førersetet. IKC hadde en ring i dørken til å huke staticlinene i – alle ble festet i den samme ringen, og alle linene ble hooket opp ved innlasting, en og en ettersom elevene lastet inn. Ved utsprang ble linen strukket og brøt alle brytetrådene, putten trakk ut pilotskjermen og sikret hurtig åpning.
IKC hadde, som 206er flest – en stor lastedør bak i kabinen på høyre side, slik at elevene som skulle settes ut ikke hadde noe stag å holde seg i eller stigtrinn å stå på, men ved kommandoen “sitt i døra!”satte eleven seg i døra på den ene skinken med ansiktet forover til hoppmesteren ga ham ordren “Gå!”.
Arne Husby – bildet ble tatt to uker senere, undr rekonstruksjonen.
Vi tok av som normalt og kom raskt opp til dropphøyden 2500 fot. Arne dirigerte meg inn med “høyre-venstre” -tegn, og sendte elev nr. 1 til “sitt i døra” – og kommanderte så “Gå!”. Med eleven vel ute og observert med normal åpning, kveilet Arne opp staticlinen (med putten i enden) og skjøv den inn under mitt sete. Ny runde, neste elev, samme prosedyre, til slutt lå det fem staticliner stuet under setet mitt. Siste runde med full climb brakte oss fra 2500 fot til 3500, Arne satte seg på huk i døren til vi var linet opp – så ga han meg et kort vink og forsvant ut av syne. Jeg trakk av på throttelen for descend.
Så, plutselig, hører jeg roping – og det er ikke i headsettet – men jeg er jo alene her oppe! Jeg ser bak meg – tomt fly – men en av staticlinene ligger stramt over dørken og ut i bakre hjørnet av døren. En ond anelse slår meg, jeg sparker hardt sideror og legger over mot høyre, og der ser jeg Arne slengende noen meter under flyet, hengende i staticlinen etter det ene benet! Jeg trimmer flyet level, spenner av setebeltet og går bakover for å se om det er mulig å huke av linen – men NIX! – den er som en felestreng!
Tilbake til setet, kaller opp Rygge Tower og foklarer at jeg har en hopper hengende under flyet. Flygelederen (Einar Solum) kommer da med de forløsende ord, som jeg aldri vil glemme: “What are your intentions?” Det satte tankevirksomheten min i gang – Hva Nå?
Det holdt på å mørkne (det var dagens siste løft), under meg hadde jeg Rygges 2400 meter betongbane og 1800 meter parallellbane pluss taxebanene og druene, til venstre hadde jeg Vannsjø, islagt. Jeg var klar på at det ikke gikk å lande på rullebane eller taxebane med Arne hengende under – han ville bli drept (sett i etterpåklokskapens klare lys kunne det vel egentlig gått bra). Uansett måtte jeg lande.
Spørsmålet var: Hvor? Isen på Vannsjø var ny og antagelig tynn og for svak til å bære flyet – og landing i isvann ville skape et nytt problem. Det jeg til å begynne med var mest opptatt av var hva Arne ville foreta seg – hvis han trakk hovedskjermen eller reserven ville ett av to skje: Enten vil benet hans bli revet av (og han vile dø av det), eller flyet ville bli stoppet i luften av motstanden og falle ned, hengende under den åpne skjemen (og vi ville begge dø). Jeg ble beroliget da ropingen stoppet – jeg trodde (og håpet) at Arne hadde mistet bevisstheten (det hadde han ikke – mer om det senere).
Eilif, desember 1977
Igjen ble jeg hjulpet av flygelederen, som sa:”What about on the grass between the runway and the taxiway?”. Javisst – der var det jo adskillig mykere, og dessuten et tynt snølag, og strekningen var romslig. Dermed tok jeg beslutningen: Land mellom taxiwayen og Runway 12 – og land med så lav hastighet som mulig.
IKC var egentlig et ideelt fly å foreta en slik landing med, konfigurasjonen var perfekt, 206en har store flaps, kraftig motor (285 hp), og vi hadde svært lav vekt: Tomt fly – bare Arne og meg, og kvarte tanker. Jeg linet opp nord for plassen i 3000 fot med sikte på landingsområdet, og begynte en lang, lang innflyging mens jeg reduserte farten gradvis. Dro på mer og mer flaps (elektriske), dro opp nesen, mer og mer power, til rundt 20 tommer MP.
Airspeeden krøp nedover og nedover ettersom jeg nærmet meg landing, men IKC holdt seg støtt og stabilt. Mot slutten var airspeedindikatoren langt under stall men motoren holdt oss oppe – vi hang på propellen – og stallwarningen ga mystisk nok ikke en lyd fra seg. Like før det valgte landingspunktet gikk det en smal betongvei tvers over til en liten instrumenthytte – da vi var nesten ved den, dro jeg av litt power, men IKC reagerte som en murstein, så jeg smalt til med et powerburst for å få oss over tverrveien.
Kontant nedslag – vi er nede! Jeg tråkker bremsene inn og kutter motoren tvert, av med beltet og hopper ut av døren – og der ligger Arne og hoier til meg:”Jeg er helt fin – helt OK!”. Det nekter jeg å tro (jeg tenker brukket rygg) og sir: “Ligg stille, ikke rør deg! – Vent på ambulansen!”. Flygelederen hadde jo trykket på knappen for lenge siden, så ambulansen er der allerede. Vi fikk huket av ham fallskjermutstyret, frigjort staticlinen fra benet (putten hade slått seg en tørn rundt ankelen og han-velcroen festet seg til hoppdressen), la ham pent på båren, og avsted gikk det til sykestuen.
Jeg skrittet opp hjulsporene og slepesporet i snøen. Hjulsporene etter IKCen var 35 meter – slepesporet etter Arne var 70 meter – believe it or not.Han hadde faktisk fungert som et drivanker under hele landingen – allerede mens vi enda var i luften.Så kom det beste av alt: Etter en halvtime kommer Arne tilbake fra sykestuen – legen hadde ikke funnet annet enn et forstuet ankel – happy end!
Men publisiteten tok fullstendig av – noen ringte VG De fikk en tegner til å lage en illustrasjon av hendelsen (den ble helt feil, med døren på feil side av flyet) men sensasjonen var der.
VGs tegning – helt feil – dør på feilside og foran i flyet …
Pressebyråene tok det opp, og historien gikk over hele verden som nyhetssnutt – jeg fikk meldinger fra venner og kjente overalt, inkludert Australia og USA, og skandalebladet National Enquirer sendte en journalist til Oslo for å intervjue meg. Så kom Billedbladet Nå og ville at Arne skulle hoppe igjen, og vi rigget til med IKC pluss følgefly og jeg fløy og Arne tro til igjen – det ble seks sider i Nå!
Forsiden til Billedbladet NA 24. desember 1977
15 år senere – i 1994 – lagde TV3 et program i serien «Alarmen går», med intervjuer av Arne og meg, flyging (med Stavanger Fallskjermklubbs 206) og hopping (ikke med oss, men med hoppere fra SFK).
Ettertanken:
Det som jeg i løpet av årene har delt med svært få er beslutningsprosessen. Da jeg først bestemte meg for å gå inn for landing på gresset, var en sakte landing det eneste jeg tenkte på. Det jeg måtte skyve fra meg – det som for meg, akkurat da, fremsto som en visshet: Jeg var i ferd med å ta livet av Arne. Bak det lå også det innebygde spørsmålet:
Er det jeg har valgt å gjøre den eneste løsningen? Hva skjer når jeg lander og har tatt livet av Arne, og alle spør ”Hvorfor gjorde du ikke slik eller slik i stedet?” – og at det skulle være en eller annen opplagt mulig handling jeg ikke hadde sett eller forstått …
Nå ble det jo ingen slik situasjon – det jeg gjorde var riktig, og det gikk svært bra – men den jævlige “hva hvis”-følelsen husker jeg den dag i dag.
Da vi til sist fikk satt oss ned og snakket om det på tomannshånd, sier Arne ganske rolig: “Nei, jeg var egentlig ikke nervøs – jeg tenkte at det er jo Eilif som flyr, han har årevis med erfaring og er stø og rolig – dette går sikkert bra!”
Han skulle ha visst …
Det jeg (vi) ikke visste, var at det hadde vært en lignende hendelse i England året før (1976), det hoppflyet ble hengende under hopperens reserveskjerm – alle klarte seg. Nedenfor er beretningen om det: Det var kanskje like godt av vi ikke visste om det …
40 år senere:
11. desember 2017 – feiret Arne og jeg vi det hele med en bedre middag med våre respektive koner – og jamen fikk VG snusen i det også – det ble nok en helside …
Hvorfor går alle utenom problemets virkelige kjerne?
Migranter fra Libya stevner mot Italia
Alle forstår at migrantene rømmer fra fattigdom og elendighet. Men ingen spør: Hvorfor er det så fattig og elendig der de kommer fra?
Når vi VET at alle landene sør for Sahara (40 land) er fruktbare, fulle av naturressurser, befolket av fysisk sterke og produktive mennesker, er velsignet med varmt klima, enorme uutnyttede områder med rike jordbruksmuligheter, og dermed har alle forutsetninger for å utvikle rike og blomstrende samfunn,
HVORFOR er det ikke blomstrende og rike samfunn der?
HVORFOR stiller ingen det spørsmålet?
Migranter stormer det spanske gjerdet i Melilla (Nordafrika)
I stedet hengir vi oss til selvpisking og overøser oss selv med forklaringer som ”koloniveldets uhyrligheter” og fortidens så vel som nåtidens ”utsugning og utbytting” og ”tapping av ressurser” fra disse samfunnene.
For det hele blir jo så mye enklere når alt er vår skyld! Da kan vi jo bøte på det med penger: Bare kast penger til dem, så blir alt bra! At vi har brukt titalls milliarder av dollar, kroner, mark, franc og euro i gaver og ”bistand” på de samme landene i snart 60 år uten at noe har blitt særlig bedre, ser vi glatt bort fra.
Inger Anne Olsen skrev et par utmerkete artikler i Aftenposten om migrasjonen, og var nær ved å stille spørsmålet:
”… Titusener av de menneskene som risikerer livet i usikre båter kommer fra land der det ikke er voldelige konflikter. Hva får dem til å risikere livet? For de aller fleste av disse er Europa en drøm. De har hørt, og kanskje sett på TV, at det finnes et sted der alle har mat på bordet, hver dag. Der alle som vil, kan finne en jobb og får råd til å stifte familie, der alle barn får utdannelse, et sted der det finnes gode sykehus, og vann og strøm overalt, hele tiden. …de forestiller seg Europa som et sted der penger gror på trær, nesten bokstavelig. Et sted der alle kan klare å oppnå det de vil og skaffe alt de ønsker seg …”
”… Men den egentlige utfordringen er å jevne ut de uanstendig store forskjellene i verden: Fattigdomsforskjellen: Mange må dra tilbake dit de kom fra – og selv om de aldri fikk en sjanse til å velte seg i Europas relative rikdom, har de nå sett med egne øyne at forskjellen mellom dem selv og den jevne nordmann er akkurat så stor som de trodde.”
Men verken hun eller andre spør: Hvorfor er forskjellen der? Hvorfor har de vist seg ute av stand til å skape blomstrende samfunn, til tross for milliarder i bistand?
Migranter bryter ned gjerdet til fergeterminalen i Clalais
Den forrige store migrasjonen var i 1945-55, da 8 millioner”displaced persons” etter 2. verdenskrig ble eksportert fra Europa til Australia, Sydafrika og Canada (Australia tok 1 million alene). Men de var alle europeere, hvite og kristne, så det gikk fint, og alle mottagerlandene hadde god plass. To viktige forhold gjorde det lettere den gangen: Andelen manuelle, ufaglærte arbeidere i de moderne, utviklete landenrs arbeidsmarkeder var mange ganger større enn i dag, og Europas omfattende velferdsordninger var bare såvidt påbegynt.
Før det hadde vi de store utvandringene mellom 1850 og1910, skapt av den relative elendigheten i Europa i den perioden: 30 millioner – av en europeisk befolkning som den gang var på 250 millioner – fant seg nytt liv i Nord- og Sydamerika. Men de var jo europeere, og der de dro var det også god plass.
Dersom ikke Afrikas (syd for Sahara) 400 millioner mennesker klarer å skape moderne levevilkår – velstand – for sine egne, vil en tilsvarende flom av migranter (= 50 millioner) overvelde Europa i løpet av én generasjon . Men det er ikke plass til dem her, slik det var i Amerika.
Det er detteEU-landenes (og våre) feildisposisjoner leder til. En slik mengde migranter vil ikke bare sprenge Europas ressurser – de vil også gradvis fortrenge den innovative og produktive befolkingen som skapte den Europeiske sivilisasjonen (den som befolket Amerika) – slik at de som i dag feiler i Afrika vil bli dominerende i Europa.
Resultatet må enhver kunne se: Europa vil miste evnen til å opprettholde de leveforholdene som lokket migrantene, og vi havner alle i den elendigheten de rømte fra.
Migranter har brutt ut av inngjerdingen i Clais
Det går an å legge sammen 2 og 2. Det er IKKE greit når ”selvbestemmelsesretten” til en ”selvstendig stat” medfører at en despot sitter i et (varmt og fruktbart) land med 700.000 innbyggere og oljeinntekter på 150 milliarder kroner årlig og stapper pengene i egne lommer (og bygger luksusvillaer i Paris) mens befolkningen er uten rent vann, har verdens høyeste rater av malaria, tyfus og denguefeber og 6% har HIV/AIDS, og må leve av det de selv dyrker i bakgården sin. Sjekk ut Obiang Nguema Mbasongo/Ekvatorialguinea. Nylig fikk han klapp på skulderen av Obama og familiefoto i det hvite hus.
Mbasongo family with Obama
Hvis noen tror at eksempelet ovenfor er enestående tar de grundig feil – forskjellene er bare i graden av vanstyre. Det er summen av alt dette vanstyre som får hundretusener til å rømme i retning Europa, der alle får penger og hus og mat – helt gratis. Livsfarlig reise betyr ingen ting – deres syn på fare og graden av forlokkelse kan vi i Europa ikke forestille oss. Scenene fra Middelhavet, fra Melilla og fra Calais viser det til fulle.
Selvsagt propaganderer jeg ikke for at den veletablerte delen av verden skal bruke makt for å rydde opp i alt dette vanstyre – de velmenendes hylekor ville stoppe det. I steden sier jeg:
1. Slutt å kaste gode penger etter dårlige.
2. Stopp migrasjonen for alle uten politisk beskyttelsesbehov.
3. Bruk økonomisk-politiske tvangsmidler for å tvinge de stjålne pengene tilbake til hjemlandet fra alle de skjulte gjemmesteder i utlandet.
4. Press de evneløse lederne til å bruke alle pengene i sine egne hjemland.
PS: Jeg har jobbet i 25 år av mitt liv med prosjekter i Afrika (i 30 land) og i Midtøsten.
Har du sett Osvald-monumentet på Jernbanetorget – 19 tonn i beste sovjetstil ?- Hammeren som knuser hakekorset utenfor Østbanehallen på Oslo S har skapt bruduljer og møtt mye motstand
Gamle AKP-ere maste og fislet helt til godtroende og tankeløse (yngre) politikere gikk med på å reise et monument over Asbjørn Sundes ”Osvald”-gruppe. Men hvem var nå de?
Aftenpostens journalist Gunnar Kagge skrev 3. oktober 2015 om en ny bok. Her er enkeltutdrag av hans artikkel (Alle tekstutvalg, uthevelser og tekst i kursiv er gjort av meg. EN)
”Under krigen var sabotasje langt mer omstridt enn vi har fått inntrykk av i ettertid. Da freden kom, ble noen sabotører helter, mens andre ble støtt ut i mørket.
20. april 1943 kom en lastebil nedover Pilestredet med fem mann. Utenfor arbeidskontoret stoppet de og ropte til folk på gaten at de måtte komme seg unna. Med brannbomber (molotovcocktails), og granater var målet arkivet over unge nordmenn tyskerne ville sende på tvangsarbeid.
Sprengningen av arbeidskontoret var en av krigens viktigste aksjoner, fordi den gjorde at planene om tvangsarbeid måtte skrinlegges. Aksjonen var også første gang Hjemmefrontens Milorg samarbeidet med den kommunistiske Osvald-gruppen. Asbjørn Sunde fikk i begynnelsen av krigen kodenavnet Osvald og gruppen han ledet ble kalt opp etter ham.
Osvaldgruppen sprengte Østbanestasjonen i Oslo 1942
Ii 1937 reiste Asbjørn Sunde til den spanske borgerkrigen (se Den spanske borgerkrigen, nedenfor. EN). Da han kom hjem etter halvannet år, ble han engasjert i Wollwebergruppen som drev sabotasje mot skip som fraktet materiell for Nazi-Tyskland (se Wollweber nedenfor. EN).
Etter at Sovjetunionen ble angrepet av Tyskland, bygget han den om til en sabotasjegruppe. De første årene drev de med både likvidasjoner og sprengninger. Osvald-gruppen opptrådte også på egen hånd, ikke minst med sprengning av toglinjer og jernbanestasjoner.
Men etter krigen ble Max Manus og Gunnar Sønsteby heltene, mens Osvald-gruppen ble skjøvet ut i historiens mørke. Det berodde på at Sunde var kommunist og fikk ordre fra sovjetisk etterretning. Da den kalde krig startey i 1948, passet ikke Osvald-gruppen som krigshelter. Egil Ulateig skrev kritisk om Sunde og Osvald-gjengen i 1989.
I februar 1942 sprengte både Østbane- og Vestbanestasjonen. Dette var den første spektakulære aksjonen deres. Et halvt år senere smalt det kraftig igjen, Statspolitiets kontorer i Oslo var målet. Hjemmefrontens ledelse skrev da til London-regjeringen og tok kraftig avstand fra slike aksjoner som «kunne få de uhyggeligste konsekvenser». De mente å vite at det var kommunister som sto bak.
Osvaldgruppen stengte AS Per Kure i 1943
Sunde hadde kontakt med politimannen Asbjørn Bryhn, som ga ham en liste over ønskede terrormål, som Statspolitiets kontor og navngitte politimenn. Sunde selv var kommunist, men ikke partimedlem. Han mottok ordre fra sovjetiske NKVD, ingen andre. Samtidig samarbeidet Sunde med deler av Hjemmefronten, ikke minst om likvidasjoner. Etter hvert som Milorg vokste økte konfliktene med Osvald-gruppen. Det hendte også at Osvaldgruppenstjal fra Milorgs flyslipp.
«Oppløs organisasjonen og send folkene inn i polititroppene i Sverige!» lød ordren fra Sovjet sommeren 1944 (Merk: nesten ett år før krigens slutt!. EN). Sunde var lojal, avviklet og sendte i stedet gikk folkene inn i politiarbeidet i Sverige (Sundes folk infiltrerte de norske polititroppene, slik de ble beordret: Da Sovjet gikk inn i Norge i oktober 1944 ble polititropene satt inn i Finnmark – og de infiltrerte Sovjetagentene fulgte med på lasset! EN).
Etterlysing av Sunde og Bruun 1943
Ti år senerere ble Asbjørn Sunde arrestert og dømt som spion for Sovjetunionen. Det var kald krig, og Norge brukte store ressurser på overvåking. På denne tiden brukte Politiets overvåkingstjeneste mesteparten av ressursene sine på å overvåke Asbjørn Sunde, som hadde regelmessig kontakt med den sovjetiske ambassaden. Men politiet hadde ikke nok til å arrestere ham før januar 1954. Han ble dømt til åtte års fengsel.
Etter å ha lest denne artikkelen sendte jeg Kagge følgende kommentar (5. oktober 2015):
Jeg har gjennom flere år lest dine artikler med stor interesse – de om diverse land og om gamle kart – alltid interessant lesning og ofte nytt stoff. I dag skriver jeg imidlertid til deg som kritisk kommentator – det dreier seg om din presentasjon av boken om Asbjørn Sunde. Din fremstilling og ordbruk reagerte jeg sterkt på. For meg var det urimelig historieløst – og jeg bruker ikke uttrykket om fakta, men om manglede forståelse for og innsikt i datidens holdninger og tenkesett – datidens egentlige realiteter.
Gjennom hele 50- og 60-tallet var hele den vestlige verden (som inkluderte hele Sydamerika, hele Afrika og det meste av Asia utenom Kina og Sovjet) helt ut enige om én ting: At kommunisme var noe jævelskap og kommunister var villige agenter for Sovjet – for det var det de var. Enigheten illustreres best ved at FN-styrkene i Korea (340 000 mann) besto av enheter fra 17 – sytten(!) – land utenom Sør-Koreas egne 600000, og omfattet ,i tillegg til USA, Colombia, Ethiopia, Thailand, New Zealand, Hellas og Tyrkia (for å nevne noen som er lite kjent)
Kumwah – januar 1953
Du vil forstå meg bedre når jeg forteller deg at jeg kom til Norge som (norsk) flyktning fra Spania i 1936, vokste opp i Norge under 2. verdenskrig, at jeg avtjente min verneplikt i Tysklandsbrigaden 1951-52, og deltok i Koreakrigen 1952-53 (den som ennå ikke er slutt). På den bakgrunnen er det bittert å lese en fremstilling av Asbjørn Sunde som en stakkars miskjent norsk patriot som kjempet for fedrelandet. Han var en ekte kommunist av verste sort, hvis mål med kampen var det stikk motsatte av frigjøring.
Når du skriver at ”han bygde opp sin gruppe på restene av skips-sabotasjegruppen fra 30-årene”, som han hadde vært aktiv deltager i, så bør du lese Håkon Lies redegjørelse til Lund-kommisjonen om bl.a. Wollwebers sabotasjeaksjoner mot sivile handelsskip (se Wollweberligaen, nedenfor, EN). De var rendyrkete terrorister etter alle målestokker, både datidens og nåtidens. Du sier: ”Sunde mottok sine instrukser fra NKVD” som om det var helt greit – du vet vel at NKVD var den Sovjetiske statens sikkerhetsdepartement? Som drev Gulagene?
Du minner meg om Lund-kommisjonen, som dømte ting som hendte i 50- og 60-årene ut fra holdningene i dag – nye holdninger skapt av mennesker som aldri har vært i krig og som lever i en helt annen verden enn den som det de dømmer over, skjedde i. For oss som levde da, er det skammelig at en landsforreder (i ordets egentlige betydning) som Sunde og hans pakk har fått et minnesmerke i Oslo.
I hele etterkrigstiden har det i Norge blitt sementert en myte om norske idealister som kastet seg inn i kampen for demokrati i Spania i 1936-39, mens de i realiteten var organisert av Internasjonalen i Moskva) (se Den spanske borgerkrigen, nedenfor. EN). Les Anthony Beevor, han pleier å være pålitelig. Sannheten er jævlig nok. Jeg hadde egentlig ventet bedre innsikt fra deg. Om håndteringen av Asbjørn Sunde og sannheten rundt andre Spaniaveteraner etter krigen, (lesAsbjørn Sunde og andre Spaniaveteraner, nedenfor – EN). – Mvh, Eilif Ness, (nå i Norge – hjemflyttet fra Kypros)
Dette er Gunnar Kagges svar til meg (6. oktober 2015):
Kjære Eilif Ness, Tusen takk for interessant «notat». Du har jo en livshistorie som kunne vært en egen artikkel. Sunde/Osvald er fortsatt en kontroversiell historie. Det visste jeg da jeg skrev artikkelen. Egentlig er det trist at det langt på vei er gamle AKPere som skriver om dem. Et hederlig unntak er Frode Ferøy som disputerte med en avhandling om den kommunistiske motstandsbevegelsen nå i våres. Han jobber ved Hjemmefrontmuseet.
Jeg er helt enig i at Sundes engasjement før krigen bærer preg av terrorisme, og at det kunne vært bedre forklart. Men her må jeg «skylde på» plassen, selv to hele avissider blir i trangeste laget. Derfor gikk jeg ikke nærmere inn på det. Men at Sunde mottok ordre fra NKVD skriver jeg jo. Og det var selvsagt ikke uproblematisk. London-regjeringen og Hjemmefrontens ledelse forsøkte å stanse alle «uautoriserte» sabotasjeaksjoner. De la listen veldig høyt for alle aksjoner, i frykt for represalier. Sunde brøt kraftig med denne linjen. Samtidig er det viktig å huske at Linge-karene også handlet på tvers av Regjeringens ønsker. Med SOE gjennomførte de aksjoner i Norge som førte til alvorlige konflikter mellom War Cabinet og den norske regjeringen. Samtidig var Sunde et redskap for deler av hjemmefronten. Karene hans var av de hardeste og mest hensynsløse. Derfor kom de til nytte ved likvideringer, for eksempel.
Jeg setter veldig pris på den grundige tilbakemeldingen din. Målet for en journalist er selvsagt ikke at alle lesere skal like alt hele tiden. Noen ganger blir noen provosert, ellers er det for tamt! Men slurv og feil leverer vi også. Og det irriterer meg kraftig når det er meg som er synderen…
Med vennlig hilsen, Gunnar Kagge, journalist
Wollweberligaen
Ernst Wollweber – Moskva-styrt terrorist – senere sjef for DDRs Stasi
(Kilder: L.Borgersrud: «Die Wollweber-organisation und Norwegen» (Berlin, 2001), og Lundkommisjonen, 1996)
Ernst Wollweber ble født i Hannover i 1898, gikk yil sjøs i 1912 og inn i Tysklands Keiserlige Marine 16 år gammel og tjenestegjorde i ubåtvåpenet under første verdenskrig. I november 1918 deltok han i Wilhelmshavenmytteriet, en meget omtalt oppstand blant tyske marinegaster. Da Weimar-republikken fikk makten i Tyskland i 1919 gikk han inn i det tyske kommunistpartiet KPD. Wollweber steg rask i gradene i partiet, ble medlem av KPDs sentralkomite leder for KPDs militante fløy i Hessen, Thüringen og Schlesien fra 1923. Hans aktiviteter førte til at han ble arrestert i 1924, anklaget for høyforrederi, men ble sluppet fri i1926. I 1928 ble han valgt inn i Landestag Freistaat Preussen og i 1932 til Reichstag. I 1931 ble han leder for the den Kominternstyrte International Union of Seamen and Harbour Workers (ISH).
Ernst Wollweber, kommunistisk skipssabotør 1936-40, Stasisjef i DDR 1953-58
Da Hitler forbød KPD i Tyskland i 1933, måtte Wollweber flykte til København og senere til Leningrad. I 1936 dro han til Oslo (hans kone Ragnhild, f. Wiik, var norsk). Fra sitt skjulested i en boligblokk på Sinsen organiserte Wollweber i tiden fra 1936 til 1940 «Organisation Against Fascism and in Support of the USSR», bedre kjent som Wollweberligaen, en sabotasjeorganisasjon som gjennomførte 21 kjente tilfeller av sabotasje mot tyske og andre skip som seilte til Tyskland fra skandinaviske og andre nordeuropeiske havner. Nordmennene Martin Hjelmen, Asbjørn Sunde og tyskeren Josef “Conrad” Amann var blant sabotørene i Oslo.
Wollweber også våpenleveranser til den republikanske siden i den spanske borgerkrigen. Han var ettersøkt over hele verden, og ble til slutt arrestert i Sverige i 1940, der han ble dømt til tre års fengsel. Asbjørn Sunde overtok Wollwebers sabotasjeorgabisasjon – det ble grunnlaget for “Osvald”-gruppen. Mans Wollweber satt i fengsel i Sverige, ble han tildelt sovjetisk statsborgerskap, og etter sterkt press fra Sovjet lot den svenske regjeringen ham å reise dit i 1944.
I 1945 returnerte Wollweber til Tyskland og ble med i SED – Det tyske sosialistiske enhetsparti – Østtysklands statsbærende parti. Ett år senere ble han leder for sentralstyringen av skipsfarten, og i 1950 viseminister i samferdselsministeriet i DDR. Samtidig gikk det rykter i Vesten om at han hadde startet en ny Wollweber-organisasjon for Sovjet, for å lære opp kommunistagenter i skipssabotasje – det ble aldri bekreftet, men dansk etterretning var overbevist om at Wollweber hadde opprettet et sovende sabotasjenettverk i Skandinavia og Vest-Tyskland. På midten av 1950-tallet observerte de at mange reiste på 8-10 dagers kurs i Øst-Berlin. Dette ble knyttet en STASI-radiosender sør for Berlin. I 1957 fikk PET opplysninger fra finsk etterretning om at en sovjetisk spionorganisajon var aktiv i Danmark. Helt sikkert var det at Wollweber aktiverte sin tidligere agent Josef Amann (Gregor), som ble sentral i pågripelsen av den vesttyske kommunisttoppen Kurt Müller i Øst-Berlin i 1950. Da Müller ble forhørt i det beryktede Hohenschönhausen-fengselet, måtte “Gregor” gå i dekning i Øst-Berlin. Årsaken var at Müllers kone hadde sluppet unna, og sørget for at den hemmelige prosessen mot parlamentarikeren offentlig kjent.
Stasi-sjefen 1954-58, Ernst Wollweber gratulerer DDR-president Wilhelm Pieck med fodselsdagen (1955)
I 1952, året før Ernst Wollweber ble STASI-sjef, bidro han til at Josef Amman (Gregor) ble KGB-spesialist på sabotasjeaksjoner og minelegging. I 1953 ble “Gregor” sendt til Moskva for møter med Pavel Sudoplatov om sabotasjearbeidet i Danmark, Vest-Tyskland og Frankrike. Etter endt opphold på «sabotasje- og terrorskolen» utenfor Øst-Berlin brukte “Gregor” de neste ti årene på å planlegge operasjoner og bygge opp sabotasjegrupper rettet mot amerikanske mål og NATO-installasjoner. Sabotasjen skulle sette NATO-installasjoner ut av spill i en krise- eller krigssituasjon. Moskvas krav til KGB-residentene i alle europeiske NATO-land og nøytrale Sverige, Østerrike og Sveits var å levere fire til seks detaljerte sabotasjeplaner i året. En av de illegale KGB-agentene som planla sabotasje i Norge er omtalt i Mitrokhin-arkivet som kodenavnet «Gratsjov» var her flere ganger på topphemmelige oppdrag.
I august 1953 ble Wollweber utnevnt Sikkerhetsminister (sjef for Stasi). Wollweber gikk inn for å styrke Stasis myndighet i arbeidet for å hindre vestlig etterretnings infiltrering av GDR, men dette brakte ham i konflikt med sterke krefter i SEDs ledelse, særlig med Walter Ulbricht og Erich Honecker.
I 1954 ble Wollweber delegat til Volkskammer – folkeparlamentet – og medlem av SEDs Sentralkomite. Etter 1956 minket hans innflytelse etter hvert som han kom på kollisjonskurs med Walter Ulbricht og Erich Honecker om saker fra Østtysklands politikk overfor Polen til antallet antikommunistiske grupper i DDR. I 1957 ble Wollweber tvunget til å gå av som sjef for Stasi. Han ble etterfulgt av sin nestkommanderende, Erich Mielke. In 1958 ble Wollweber beskyldt for anti-SED aktiviteterog ble fjernet fra Sentralkomiteen. Han levde anonymt i Østberlin som tolk til sin død i 1967.
Asbjørn Sunde og andre Spaniaveteraner etter 1945 …
Journalisten Lise Lindbæk rapporterte fra Spania i 1937
at hun møtte Asbjørn Sunde som ambulansesjåfør “på «alskens rare veier i syd og i nord”. Etter flere år til sjøs behersket han spansk godt. Med militær utdanning og opplæring som kanonskytter (fra den norske marinen) og styrmannseksamen (1929) var Sunde motivert for andre oppdrag, og gikk etter hvert inn i en republikansk partisanbataljon, som utførte sabotasjeoperasjoner og likvideringer bak fronten. Asbjørn Sunde kom tilbake til Norge med erfaring som ga ham en sentral rolle i den væpnede kampen mot nazismen.
Republikansk milits – Borgerkrigen i Spania 1936-39 – med knyttnevehilsen
Da Sovjetunionen skapte Østblokken gjennom en serie kommunistiske statskupp i Østeuropa i 1946-48, det som Churchill betegnet som “å senke et jernteppe” , oppsto den “kalde krigen”. Sovjet med sine vasallstater ble Vestens fiende. Dermed ble de norske kommunistene Arbeiderpartiets og den norske stats fiende. Statsminister Einar Gerhardsen innledet en kraftig antikommunistisk offensiv, og i en tale i februar 1949 la han ikke fingrene imellom i sin beskrivelse av kommunistenes intensjoner:
“Det var mange som under krigen gikk med dem i god tro, fordi de trodde kommunistpartiet var nasjonalt og demokratisk. I dag har ingen lenger rett til å være i god tro. De som står i spissen for kommunistpartiet i Norge, er Komintern- og Kominform-kommunister. Som sine kampfeller i andre land er de i sine hjerter tilhengere av terror og diktatur. Ingen vakre deklamasjoner må lenger hindre folk i å se denne brutale sannheten åpent i øynene — selv om det for mange blir en uhyggelig oppdagelse.»
Sommeren 1949 ble begrepet «femtekolonnist» definert av Kongen i statsråd: “Med femtekolonnevirksomhet forstås virksomhet fra en-keltpersoner, grupper eller organisasjoner som går ut på ved planlegging og gjennomføring av etterretningsvirksomhet, sabotasje, infiltrasjon, propaganda, attentater, m.v., å svek-ke landets forsvar og alminnelige forsvarsevne”.
Forside billedbladet Nå, 1954
En rekke tiltak skulle forhindre destabilisering og sabotasje fra kommunistisk side. Det ble opprettet et register over «femtekolonnister» som grunnlag for arrestordre og eventuell internering. I den kalde krigen ble Spaniaveteranene ansett som mulige deltakere i en kommunistisk sabotasjeorganisasjon: overvåkningspolitiet hadde en liste med 130 navn på Spania-frivillige – de ble rangert likt med agentene fra krigens tyske etterretningsorganisasjon Abwehr. Overvåkningssjef Bryhn mente at Spaniakjemperne, i likhet med Abwehr-agentene hadde «vist slik fanatisme og kynisme at de måtte anses som villige til å tjenestegjøre for hvilket som helst annet land”. I et rundskriv fra 1950 framholdt overvåkningspolitiet at begge gruppene måttte følges med spesiell oppmerksomhet – et fellestrekk var at begge var lettpåvirkelige hvis de ble utsatt hverving for landsskadelig virksomhet.
Asbjørn Sundes politiske overbevisning kombinert med hans erfaring som kommandosoldat i Spania og hans ledelse av Osvald-gruppa under okkupasjonen gjorde at han pekte seg ut som svært farlig. Overvåkningspolitiet drevet aktiv spaning på ham fra 1949. I 1954 ble Sunde fengslet og dømt til åtte års fengsel for spionasje til fordel for Sovjetunionen. I 1956 ble Arthur Iversen Folden, tidligere Spaniakjemper og Osvaldmedlem, mistenkt for spionasje til fordel for Sovjetunionen, men unngikk å bli tatt ved å rømme til Sovjetunionen. Senere etterretningsmateriale har avdekket at han allerede i 1943 ble vervet av russerne og siden opererte under dekknavnet «Erik».
Etter 1990 har gamle AKP-mlere stått på iherdig for å få disse spionene og forræderne omdannet til “motstandsfolk”. Hensikten er hele tiden klar: ved å ufarliggjøre dem reduseres graden av AKPernes eget forrederi som agenter for fiendtlige makter – Stasi inkludert. Blåøyde og godtrende unge politikere lar seg villig lure.
Den Spanske Borgerkrigen 1936-1939
Norge og Franco-Spania
Den spanske borgerkrigen et lite kjent tema i dagens Norge. Det som er av offisiell historie dekker mindre enn halve virkeligheten. Fra borgerkrigens første dag var norske omtaler av borgerkrigen preget av Norges offisielle fulle støtte til Spanias republikanske regjering – en naturlig følge av at Norges regjering war utgått av Arbeiderpartiet, og av at Franco så åpenbart ble støttet av Hitler og Mussolini.
Det mislykkete kuppet
Bakgrunnen for kuppet var de forgående fem år med streiker, opptøyer og kaos. I 1931 hadde en folkeavstemning ført til at Spania ble reublikk, og kongen forlot landet. Den republikanske regeringen var dominert av sterke, konkurrerende fagforbund og store grupper anarkister og kommunister, med særlig stor støtte i det industritette Catalonia med Barcelona. Dårlig styring gjorde at streiker og opptøyer var dagens orden. All uroen skapte sterke motkrefter, med den nye fascistiske bevegelsen Falange i spissen. Store deler av hæren støttet Falange.
Arbeidermilits i Barcelona juli 1936
Francos kupp i juli 1936 skulle vært et unnagjort på tre-fire dager, men da militæret skulle besette viktige punkter i de større byene, viste det seg at en del av hærens avdelinger valgte å støtte den republikanske regjeringen. I tillegg utløstes voldsomme krefter i folkemassene, som fryktet gjeninnføring av de århundregamle sosialreligiøse hierarkiet de nylig var blitt kvitt, og reiste seg til kamp. Oppildnet av den russiske revolusjon bare 20 år tidligere, og godt hjulpet av sovjetiske eksperter, kastet de seg mot en fascistisk bevegelse støttet av nazi-Tyskland og fascist-Italia, og alt kom fullstendig ut av kontroll. I stedet for et raskt kupp ble et tre år langt blodbad.
Fler mennesker ble myrdet og henrettet under den spanske borgerkrigen enn det falt soldater på slagmarken. De sydlige og vestlige områdene kom raskt under fascistisk kontroll, mens de østlige og nordøstlige områdene ble kontrollert av den republikanske regjeringen. Skillet gikk midt gjennom hovedstaden Madrid, som var en krigssone i 30 måneder. Begge sider jaktet på og utryddet enhver som sympatiserte med motstanderen. Hvor mange denne krigen tok livet av er helt til i dag et ubesvart spørsmål. Det som skiller denne krigen fra alle andre kriger i moderne tid er det enorme antallet som ble henrettet eller myrdet- som ikke falt strid. Det antas å ha vært vært rundt 120.000. Av disse må – etter alt å dømme – vinneren Franco stilles til ansvar for rundt 40,000, og taperen, Republikken, for rundt 80,000.
Den norske historieversjonen
I Norge og Sverige lyder fortsatt historien, som gjentas igjen og igjen i aviser, på TV og i bøker, at det var Francos falangister som henrettet tusener uskyldige under borgerkrigen. De myrdet ganske visst mange, men i Norden sies det aldri et ord om de myrderiene som de republikanske styrkene – regulære og irregulære – bedrev helt fra krigens begynnelse, og som var vel så omfattende som falangistenes, og om mulig enda mer tilfeldige.
Massakre i Modelo
Den norske (nordiske) versjonen er etter hvert blitt så innarbeidet, opplest og vedtatt at det er omtrent umulig å ta opp noen del av den til en normal diskusjon. Det var de republikanske myrderiene – republikanernes “tsjekaer”, de antifascistiske arbeidermilitsene – som myrdet for fote i det republikanske Madrid, som fikk tusener av mennesker i den republikanskstyrte del av Spania til å søkte beskyttelse i utenlandske ambassader og legasjoner
Norske tiltak – Asylantene i Madrid
Inntaket av flyktningene i legasjonen skjedde meget mot den norske regjerings vilje og til stor irritasjon for politikerne på ytre venstre i Norge, men kaste dem ut kunne ingen – for det var den visse død. Til gjengjeld løftet ikke den norske regjeringen en finger for å hjelpe flyktningene – ikke med forsyninger, ikke med penger – de toet sine hender. Det eneste de gjorde var å sende en diplomat til en ny legasjon (nr.2) i Valencia for å holde kontakt med regjeringen, for deretter å sende en attaché til legasjonen i Madrid. Det var denne Asylantene i Madrid siste som i to år var så og si alene om å organisere mat og livsnødvendigheter til de hundevis av mennesker som var stuet inn der.
Den norke legasjon i Madrid – Abascal nr. 27 huset opptil 900 flyktninger i en vanlig bygard.
Det hele startet med at det var sommerferie i legasjonene og ambassadene i Madrid da borgerkrigen brøt ut 18. juli 1936. Alle toppdiplomatene hadde reist ut av Madrid, de fleste til nordkysten – Bilbao og San Sebastian – for å unngå den verste heten i Madrid midtsommers. Det hadde også den norske minister (ambassadør) Leif Bøgh. Da myrderiene startet åpnet visekonsulen legasjonens dører for de flyktende (det gjorde de aller fleste utenlandske ambassader). I løpet av det første året av borgerkrigen reddet han på denne måten livet til ca. ni hundre flyktninger ved å ta dem inn i legasjonsbygningen og huse dem der, i en vanlig bygård i det sentrale Madrid.
Sovjets innflytelse
Ganske tidlig i konflikten begynte skipninger av våpen og ammunisjon til de republikanske styrkene. Boken ”1000 dager” har detaljerte beskrivelser av dette (inkludert opprinnelseshavnene i Baltikum) men nevner ingen ting om finansieringen. Det som skjedde var at den republikanske regjeringen overlot hele den store spanske gullbeholdningen til Sovjetunionen som betaling for russiske kanoner, tanks og fly, og åpnet sin del av grensene for sovjetiske kommissærer. Kommissærene etablerte et maktmaskineri som minnet om forholdene i Sovjetunionen. I den spanske hovedstaden ble triumfbuen ved Puerta de Alcalá fylt med enorme portretter av Stalin, og over disse hang teksten: «Lenge leve USSR!, Lenge leve Sovjetunionen!» I Puerta del Sol hang et ti meter høyt Stalinportrett og under det «Spanske antifascister, fremad til vi har overvunnet fascismen! Det russiske folk står ved deres side’ J. Stalin.»
Den republikanske regjeringen av september 1936 under Francisco Largo Caballero var helt Sovjetdominert, hans tilnavn var ”den Spanske Lenin». I oktober erstattet Largo Caballero republikkens armé med en ”Folkearmé”, etter den Sovjetiske modellen. Et krigskommissariat ble etablert, bestående av sosialistiske og kommunistiske fagforeningsledere som alle var direkte ansvarlige overfor krigsministeren, og Largo Caballero tok selv over også krigsministerens portefølje. De russiske rådgiverne hadde uhindret adgang til alle møter og deres ord veide tungt. 6. november flyttet regjeringen til Valencia.
Om natten den 7. november oppnevnte den gjenværende ”Junta de defensa” den knapt 21-årige Santiago Carrillo Solares, med titelen «Consejero de Orden Público.» til innenriksminister. Han kom fra ”Sosialistisk Ungdom”, men i det han ble tildelt embetet gikk han over til kommunistpartiet. Regjeringen kom vel frem til Valencia, og avventet passivt utfallet av det avgjørende slaget, overbevist om at hovedstadens fall var et spørsmål om timer eller i det lengste, et par dager. De avgjørende kampene varte i fjorten dager, til 23. november, til Franco fant at det ville koste for meget å bryte gjennom inn til byens sentrum.
Massakrene
Det var i denne perioden at den republikanske regjeringen gjennomførte de største massakrene. Fengslene Modelo, Ventas, San Antón and Porlier var fylt av fanger som var blitt kidnappet fra sine hjem og konsentrert der, og som propagandaen nå kalte ”soldatene i den femte kolonnen”. Den 7. november ble åtte hundre personer fra Modelo beordret inn i ventende busser og kjørt til Paracuellos de Jarama utenfor Madrid. Der ble fangene stilt opp langs en lang grøft og skutt. Andre busser kjørte til Torrejón de Ardoz lenger øst – det samme ble gjentatt der. Dette fortsatte gjennom hele november måned. Rundt 7.000 mennesker ble likvidert i Madrid på denne måten.
Den svenske professor Knut Ahnlund har analysert omstendighetene rundt denne affæren, og mener at det er sannsynlig at massakrene i Madrid i november 1936 egentlig var Stalins verk. Han hadde militære og politiske agenter aktive i Spania, som var direkte ansvarlige overfor ham. Den sovjetiske oppfatning var at høyreorienterte elementer utgjorde en dødelig fare for forsvaret mot fascistangrepet på Madrid, og måtte elimineres. Det var vitner til massakrene, og de internasjonale humanitære organisasjonene ble alarmert. Røde Kors hadde et dusin representanter på hver side, men deres arbeid ble delvis hindret av kravet om at de skulle utvise streng nøytralitet. Saken sivet etter hvert ut, og det diplomatiske korps in Madrid sendte en samlet protest til ”Junta de defensa”. Det hadde ingen virkning – eller heller den motsatte. Den 14. november erklærte regjeringen at alt snakk om hvordan de ”arresterte fascister” hadde blitt behandlet var løgn. De ville alle bli dømt overensstemmende med loven, og det ble konkludert med at de som spredte rykter om mishandling risikerte dødsstraff.
De internasjonale brigadene
Det er få krigsrelaterte hendelser som har blitt så myteomspunnet som de ”Internasjonale brigadene” i den spanske borgerkrigen. Allerede i august 1936 så Stalin at det gikk dårlig med republikanske Spania, og beordret igangsatt systematisk rekruttering gjennom Komintern, som dirigerte de nasjonale kommunistpartiene over hele verden. Ordre gikk ut til partiorganisasjonene rundt om i Europe, også til NKP. De nasjonale partiapparatene ble brukt til rekruttering, og veletablerte kanaler ble brukt for å sende de frivillige til Spania. Et samlingspunkt var ”vervingssentralen” i Paris, som registrerte dem og videresendte dem til brigadenes hovedkvarter i Albacete , et stykke vest for Valencia. Vel fremme fikk de våpen og utstyr (ofte mangelfullt) som var levert fra Sovjet. Vervingssystemet medførte at rundt 80% av alle som meldte seg til tjeneste var aktive kommunister – resten var sympatisører og/eller rene idealister, inkludert noen kjente kultupersonligheter (Hemingway, George Orwell, Nordahl Grieg), samt endel rene eventyrere. Det er få sikre kilder, men det totale antallet frivillige antas å ha vært rundt 32 000. Det er kjent at 225 var norske. Brigadenes antall falne er også usikkert, og varierer mellom 3 000 og 10 000, det er antatt at 100 av dem var norske.
2. verdenskrig.
Etter at Franco endelig beseiret republikken våren 1939, regjerte han Spania til 1975 med et gjennomført fascistisk diktatur, sørget dermed for at Spania ble plassert i bås med Nazi-Tyskland og Mussolini-Italia. Spanias nøytralitet gjennom hele 2. verdenskrig var en naturlig følge av at landet var fullstendig utarmet etter tre år med blodig borgelig, og ute av stand til krigføring (selv om spanske frivillige deltok på tysk side). Etter 1945 var Spania en politisk paria – nazi-renommeet sørget for det – men den kalde krigen mellom Sovjet og Vesten brakte raskt realpolitikk på banen. Spania inngikk baseavtale med USA i 1953, og ble medlem av FN i 1955.
Francisco Franco, diktator i Spania 1939 – 1975
At Franco fikk sitte ved makten så lenge som 36 år (1939 -75), mot Hitlers 13 år, og Mussolinis 21, kom av at den ufattelig grusomme borgerkrigen etterlot et Spania gjennomsyret av redsel for en gjentagelse (det er landet fortsatt). Men det var ingen folkereisning, verken i eller utenfor Spania, som fjernet Franco, – han selv la grunnlaget for den overgangen til demokratisk styre som fant sted etter hans død i 1976. Det var Franco selv som gjeninnførte kongedømmet ved å innsette den demokratisk innstilte Juan Carlos, og overgangen gikk smertefritt. Etter det kom Spania snart inn i varmen igjen: Medlemsskap i NATO kom i 1981, og i EU i 1986.
Kilder:
Felix Schlayer: ”Diplomat im Roten Madrid» (Berlin 1938)
Sverre Dæhlen: ”Don Felix”, hovedoppgave i historie i 1994 (UB)
Knut Ahnlund – professor i nordisk litteraturhistorie ved universitetet i Aarhus, innvalgt som medlem av Svenska Akedemin i 1983.
Anthony Beevor: ”the Spanish Civil War” (London, 1980)
S.Moen & R. Sæther: ”Tusen dager” (Oslo, 2009)
Erling Chr. Ness: Norges Charges d’affaires i Madrid 1937-39: private brev og dagbøker, offisielle rapporter 1936-40.
En allmenn oppfatning kan være sann, men er det ikke nødvendigvis.
”Allmenn oppfatning” er ideer som allmennheten oppfatter som alminnelig akseptert: – ubestridte sannheter – de danner ofte grunnlaget fpr holdninger. Noen slike oppfatninger blir overført fra forelder til barna, mens ytterlige ideer og meninger blir tilført under skolegang og utdannelse. I tillegg er allmennheten, gjennom media, kontinuerlig utsatt for påvirkning av uttalelser og påstander fra toneangivende skribenter og ledere.
Noen ganger skaper slike etablerte sannheter hindringer for alminnelig aksept av ny informasjon, nye teorier og nye forklaringer.
Begrepet ”allmenn oppfatning” (”conventional wisdom”) tillegges vanligvis økonomen John Kenneth Galbraith, som brukte det i 1958 i sin bok «Det velstående samfunn» (”The Affluent Society”). Begrepet er egentlig mye eldre, og kan dateres tilbake minst til 1838, som et ofte nedsettende synonym for «aksepterte sannheter».
Galbraith skjerpet betydningen av begrepet til å bety oppfatninger som samfunnet vanligvis finner akseptable og komfortable, og som dermed øker tendensen til å avvise fakta som kan redusere deres betydning. Han brukte ofte uttrykket for å forklare den sterke motstand mot nye ideer som av og til oppstảr innen økonomisk akademia.
Nye teorier om, og forklaringer på, aksepterte og ubestridte sannheter kan noen ganger oppfattes som forandring av det bestående, og det fører tidvis til (tidvis heftig) motstand. En viktig årsak til det er at den allmenne oppfatning ofte er basert hva som er praktisk, appellerer til, og er gjennomgående akseptert av allmennheten.
Overbevisende eksempler vil over tid kunne endre allmenne oppfatninger. For eksempel var det en allmenn oppfatning i 1950, selv blant leger, at røyking ikke var helseskadelig. I løpet av de etterfølgende tiårene er den allmenne oppfatningen endret, slik at det i dag (2015) er allment akseptert at røyking er skadelig.
Begrepet allmenn oppfatning gjelder også i politisk forstand. Det brukes av og til for å illustrere at uttalelser som til stadighet gjentas gjerne blir til allmenn oppfatning uansett om de er sanne eller ikke. Politiske allmenne oppfatninger motstår gjerne endring: De som holder sterkt på en utdatert politisk oppfatning motsetter seg endringer.
34 000 falne FN-soldater ble ikke funnet verdige til inkludering i Nobels Fredspris …
Koreakrigen med forfatteren David Halberstams ord:
“Den 25. juni 1950, krysset syv nordkoreanske divisjoner grensen til Sørkorea. Intensjonen var å erobre Sørkorea på tre uker. Den Sørkoreanske hæren var fullstendig uforberedt, og de eneste amerikanske styrkene i landet var en liten gruppe militære rådgivere. USA, under president Harry Truman – med godkjennelse av FNs sikkerhetsråd – besluttet raskt å bruke amerikanske og andre FN-lands styrker for å stoppe kommunistenes fremrykning i Korea, og overførte tropper fra Japan.
(Sikkerhetsrådets godkjennelse kom i stand fordi Sovjetunionen (av andre grunner) boycottet Sikkerhetsrådets møter på den tiden, og fikk dermed ikke gjort bruk av sitn vetorett – EN)
Harry Truman nedtonte konflikten for å unngå konfrontasjon med Sovjet. Derfor ble ikke konfikten kalt “krig”, mem “FN politiaksjon”. Korekrigen skulle komme til å vare i tre år, ikke tre uker, men selv om den kostet 34 000 FN-soldater livet, ble den ikke til en storkrig slik som den annen verdenskrig, heller ikke kom den til å bli, slik som Vietnamkrigen én generasjon senere, varig historisk splittende.»
Med mine ord:
Koreakrigen var en FN-operasjon under FN-flagg på samme måte som de senere aksjonene i Suez (1956) og Kongointervensjonen (1960). Vietnamkrigen derimot, liksom de to Golfkrigene, krigen i Afghanistan og Irakkrigen, var (er) USA-ledete operasjoner med internasjonal deltagelse men uten FN-godkjennelse.
Fredsprisen
Da industrimagnaten Alfred Nobel satte opp sine priser (som administreres av Svenska Akademin) skilte han ut Fredsprisen, og overlot tildelingen av den til Norges Storting. Stortinget oppnevner de fem medlemmene av Den Norske Nobelkomite, vanligvis tre tidligere politikere og to kulturpersonligheter.
Nobelkomiteens medlemmer i 1988 var: Egil Aarvik,(formann, Krf), Gidske Anderson, (Ap), Francis Sejersted, (H), Odvar Nordli,(Ap), Gunnar Stålsett, (Sp). I 1988 besluttet disse medlemmene av Nobelkomiteen å tildele Fredsprisen til “the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces”, en avgjørelse som falt god jord hos de fleste, helt til sannheten kom frem i Egil Aarviks tildelingstale: Det viste seg der at teksten var omhyggelig formulert slik at FN-aksjonen i Korea i 1950-53 ble utelatt:
(Sitat:) “The original United Nations treaty does mention the possibility of military involvement on the part of the United Nations in the event of hostilities, but, because of the relationship between the great powers, it has never been possible to make use of this part of the treaty – the possible exception being the action in Korea in 1950.
… peace keeping operations were commenced in 1956 (…) in connection with the Suez crisis. The Security Council was unable to act because of a veto from two of the member states. This was solved by summoning the UN General Assembly to a special session, which passed the «Uniting for Peace» resolution that gives the United Nations’ General Assembly the power to intervene in the event of the Security Council being unable to act. This resolution was used to deploy a peacekeeping force …” (Sitat slutt) (uthevelsene er gjort av meg – EN)
“The possible exception” er tilfeldigvis den eneste gangen FNs Sikkerhetsråd – FNs høyeste operasjonelle myndighet – har godkjent en militæraksjon slik FN-pakten tillot. Tilfeldigvis besto “the relationship between the great powers” på den tiden i at Sovjetunionen boykottet Sikkerhetsrådet, og dermed avskar seg selv fra å nedlegge veto.
Dermed valgte Nobelkomiteen i 1988, som startpunkt for “UN Peacekeeping Forces”,en smart papirmanøvre fra 1956 som tillot omgåelse av Sikkerhetsrådet, fremfor Sikkerhetsrådets lovlige og rettfremme beslutning av 1950. Slik klarte Nobelkomiteen å holde utenfor Fredsprisen en legal FN-aksjon som kostet 34.000 (ikke-koreanske) FN-styrker livet.
34,000 UN soldiers ikilled in action not found worthy of inclusion in the Peace Prize
The Korean War in author David Halberstam’s words:
“On June 25, 1950, seven divisions of North Korean troops crossed the border into South Korea, intending to conquer the entire South in three weeks. The South Korean Army was completely unprepared for the attack, and the only US force in Korea was a tiny advisory mission. The US government, under President Harry Truman – with the approval of the UN Security Council – quickly decided to use US and UN forces to draw a line against the Communists in Korea, initially transferring forces from Japan.
(The approval of the Security Council was due to the Soviet Union boycotting the Security Council meetings at the time (for other reasons), so they did not get to use their veto – EN)
Harry Truman, intent on limiting any confrontation with the Soviet Union, downplayed the nature of the conflict, and called it not a “war”, but “a United Nations police action«. The Korean War came to last three years, not three weeks, and, even at the cost of 34,000 UN soldiers’ lives, it did not become a Great War, such as World War II, nor did it, like Vietnam a generation later, come to divide and haunt history.”
In my words:
Notably, the Korean War was a United Nations operation under the UN flag, just as the later Suez action (1956) and the Congo intervention (1960). The later Vietnam War, however, was a US led operation with international participation but without without UN approval, as were the two Gulf Wars, the Afghan War and the Iraqi War.
The Peace Prize
When industrial magnate Alfred Nobel instituted his series of prizes (administered by the Swedish Academy) he separated out the Peace Prize, and entrusted its administration to Norway’s parliament, the Storting. The Storting appoints the five member of the Norwegian Nobel Prize Committe, usually three previous politicians and two cultural personalities.
Members of the Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize Committee in 1988 were: Egil Aarvik, (formann, Krf), Gidske Anderson, (Ap), Frances Sejersted, (H), Odvar Nordli,(Ap), Gunnar Stålsett, (Sp). In 1988 these Nobel Prize Committee members decided to award the prize for 1988 to “the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces”, a decision that was widely applauded, at least until the fine print became apparent. When Mr. Aarvik presented the award speech on December 10th: It turned out that the text had been carefully worded to exclude UN action in Korea in 1950-53:
(quote) “The original United Nations treaty does mention the possibility of military involvement on the part of the United Nations in the event of hostilities, but, because of the relationship between the great powers, it has never been possible to make use of this part of the treaty – the possible exception being the action in Korea in 1950.
… peace keeping operations were commenced in 1956 (…) in connection with the Suez crisis. The Security Council was unable to act because of a veto from two of the member states. This was solved by summoning the UN General Assembly to a special session, which passed the «Uniting for Peace» resolution that gives the United Nations’ General Assembly the power to intervene in the event of the Security Council being unable to act. This resolution was used to deploy a peacekeeping force …”(unquote) (emphasised text by me – EN)
The “possible exception” referred to happens to be the only time that UN Security Council – UN’s highest operational authority – actually did approve a military action as the Treaty permitted. It so happened that “the relationship between the great powers” at the time prevented a Soviet veto (see footnote 1, page 2).
So, in 1988, the Nobel Committee chose, as the starting point for “UN Peacekeeping Forces”,a clever paper manoeuvre that permitted the bypassing of the Security Council in 1956, rather than the legal, straightforward decision of 1950. That way, they managed to exclude a previous legal UN action that cost 34,000 (non-Korean) UN forces’ lives. Which proves that today, most people (particularly politicians) like to appear in a humanitarian role rather than in a military one.
Report by Eilif Ness, Corporal, Guard Squad Nov. 1952 – May 1953
“On June 25, 1950, seven divisions of North Korean troops crossed the border into South Korea, intending to conquer the entire South in three weeks. The South Korean Army was completely unprepared for the attack, and the only US force in Korea was a tiny advisory mission. The US government, under President Harry Truman – with the approval of the UN Security Council[1]– quickly decided to use US and UN forces to draw a line against the Communists in Korea, initially transferring forces from Japan.
Harry Truman downplayed the nature of the conflict because he was intent on limiting any sense of growing confrontation with the Soviet Union. Therefore, the conflict was not called a “war”, but “a United Nations police action« – a terminology that endured. The Korean War came to last three years, not three weeks, but it did not become a Great War, such as World War II, nor did it, like Vietnam a generation later, come to divide and haunt history.
More than half a century later, the Korean War remains The Forgotten War, outside the world’s general consciousness. Unlike Vietnam, the Korean War took place before television news came into its own. In the days of Korea, television news shows were short, bland, and of marginal influence – it was still largely a newspaper war in black and white.
Over the years, hundreds of movies were made about World War II – as late as 2001-2003 (major anniversaries of the Korean War) four major World War II films were made. Only four movies were ever made about the Korean War – two in 1951, one in 1956 and one in 1970. The three first were minor, forgotten movies; the last one became famous.
Robert Altman’s 1970 movie MASH, about a mobile surgical hospital during the Korean War, eventually led to a long running TV sitcom series that became very popular the world over. The sitcom did not in any way portray the terrible grisliness of that war; it did, however, create a niche for the Korean War in popular culture.
Thus, the true brutality of the Korean War never really penetrated the world’s consciousness. 34,000[2] UN troops died in it (28,000 of them Americans), and the South Korean Army lost 162,000 killed. The Chinese and North Korean losses were estimated at half a million.
The already considerable tension between the West and the Communist world grew even more serious when miscalculations brought China into the war. When finally an armed truce ensued, both sides claimed victory, although the dividing line was little different from the one that existed when the war began.
The Korean War had none of the glory of the recently concluded World War II – it was a grinding, limited war that nothing was going to come out of. After the Chinese entered the war in November 1950, the possibility of a large breakthrough never seemed near, much less anything approaching victory.
Soldiers returning from the Korean War found that their friends and neighbours were not really interested in what they had seen and done. The subject of the war was quickly dispensed with in conversation. So, the soldiers of Korea wound up with a kind of second-class status compared to that of the men who had fought in previous wars – a source of some bitterness.”
(Condensed from the Introduction chapter in the book “The Coldest Winter” by David Halberstam, 2008)
[1] The approval of the Security Council was due to the Soviet Union boycotting the Security Council meetings at the time (for other reasons), so they did not get to use their veto.
[2] Killed in action. In addition, 21,000 died of illnesses and accidents, to total 55,000 lives lost by UN forces.
The largest and bloodiest …
Out of UN’s many military missions[3] over the years, none has ever been so terribly bloody, with such enormous casualties, involving such large forces and so heavy weapons.
The UN effort in Korea involved nearly one million men: 9 divisions with personnel from 21 nations, who, together with 13 South Korean divisions fought against 1.2 million North Korean and Chinese forces for three years. Military losses: 34,600 UN troops killed in action, Republic of Korea Army: 162,400 killed in action (see Annex B for exact figures). The opposition’s losses are not known, but are estimated at more than half a million killed.
Recently (2013) South Korea hosted a reunion in memory of the signing of the armistice in July 1953. I was among the Norwegian veterans of the Korean War selected to participate in this reunion. It was a fabulous arrangement, held in Seoul and in Pusan, with more than 4000 veterans (all of them – necessarily – octogenarians!). However, all the speeches and the festivities left me with a distinct feeling of a need for a review and update of the Norwegian participation in the Korean War. This feeling was reinforced by the presence of the much younger Norwegian military who accompanied us on the vist – some of the with recent experience from Afghanistan – they deserve to be told about the real context of NORMASH.
Norway’s participation
The Norwegian contingent to the UN forces in Korea consisted of a”Mobile Army Surgical Hospital” – (MASH) – operating near the front line as component of the US 8th Army. It was operationally attached to US Army I. Corps (Bullseye) with the designation 8055 MASH (called NORMASH).
The unit was manned by 106 Norwegians (18 of which were women) under the command of a colonel (who also was NORMASH’ chief surgeon). The (all-Norwegian) medical staff numbered 58: 15 surgeons, 18 nurses and 25 assistant nurses. Support personnel (administration, communications, supply, transport, materiel, catering and security) numbered 48 Norwegians, reinforced with one platoon of ROK[4] Army military police. In addition, about 60 Korean civilians were recruited locally as support staff.
Cpl. Eilif Ness, 1952
The Guard detail, responsible for camp security and perimeter defence, consisted of one squad (10 men) Norwegians (infantry) commanded by a First Sergeant, plus the Korean MP platoon (40). The latter manned six guard posts along the camp perimeter (listening posts at night) – a wide belt of barbed wire with trip flares. The Norwegians manned the main gate and patrolled the listening posts at night.
[3] Notably, the Korean War was a United Nations operation under the UN flag (see footnote no. 1 above), just as the later Suez action (1956) and the Congo intervention (1960). The later Vietnam War, however, was a US led operation without UN approval, as were the two Gulf Wars, the Afghan War and the Iraqi War. More about this on page 16.
The reunion festivities in Seoul and Pusan in July 2013 were memorable events – four thousand surviving veterans from 21 nations met again.
NORMASH Veterans visit Uijongbu in 2013
Norwegian Korean War veterans visited Korean veterans and the Mayor of Uijongbu: Peder Fintland, Aage Kjeldsen, Gerd Semb, Arvid Fjære and Eilif Ness.
As the festivities went along, I gradually got the impression that the passing of time had created an image of the Norwegian role in Korea as a kind of humanitarian venture that had provided medical services to around 90.000 people. This is not a true picture, and obscures NORMASH’ true role.
The figure of 90.000 treated patients is essentially correct, but hides the fact that the Norwegian participation in the Korean War formed part of a large military operation and was an important contribution to the UN forces great effort in Korea.
There are several reasons for this gradual development. The primary reason, however, is very simple: By Present Day norms, most people – particularly in Norway – like to appear in the humanitarian role rather than in a military one – there is a marked reluctance to appear in any military role. Norway’s engagements in Bosnia, in Libya and in particular in Afghanistan have done little to change the political attitudes. However, Norway’s military of today has accumulated extensive know-how, and a high number of personnel with actual war experience – more that at any time since WW2
Several books and many articles have been published about NORMASH, but numbers and hard facts are few and far between. Actual figures are hard to find, as well as information about the various forces that participated and which we were part of. I feel that it is time to – once again – review (this time in closer dtail) NORMASH’ real role in the Korean War.
As all medical services – including those of the military – are humanitarian in nature, the Norwegian hospital contingency was of course a humanitarian contribution.
Military medical services, however, are just as essential to any military operation as are supply, transportation and communications. In addition to its primary task of abating the effects of personnel injuries, the qualities and mere presence of medical services are of great importance to the morale and combat efficiency of all units.
BLITZKRIEG
The Korean War started as a blitzkrieg. The North Korean Army’s massive attack across the 38th parallel overran the capital Seoul in only four days, and in less than four weeks swept South Korean and US forces all the way down to Pusan on the south-east coast. It was not until late July that large UN forces arrived in Korea.
On September 15th, the UN forces’ newly created Xth Corps (1st Marine Division og US 7th Infantry Division) made an amphibious attack at Inchon, just south of Seoul. They smashed through the North Korean forces, leaving a large part of it cut off in the south, and in a mere two months swept North Korea all the way to the Chinese border at Yalu River. This brought China into the war. A large scale Chinese Army counterattack forced UN forces back past the 38th parallel again, beyond Seoul. Then, during the spring of 1951 UN forces recaptured lost territory up to and just beyond the 38th parallel, where all had started.
THE TRENCH WAR
This blitz-krieg phase lasted 11 months – the war razed Seoul four times. July 1951 the war changed character completely – it became a World War I-style static war of trenches and bunkers, dominated by artillery, mortars, night patrols and close quarters fighting. For the next two years, as armistice negotiations proceeded at a snail’s pace, intense and bitter fighting took place over insignificant patches of ground at a very high cost in human lives.
Key hills and outposts on the Main Line of Resistance 1951-53
THE MASH CONCEPT
MASH stands for Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, a mobile surgical unit whose primary task is to follow combat units as close as possible, so that the seriously wounded receive surgical attention with the least possible delay. A MASH is (was) an operationally self-sufficient military unit with its own transport and supply services and its own defence.
The idea of providing advanced medical services as close as possible to the actual combat was launched towards the end of WW2 because so many of the seriously wounded died before reaching surgical treatment units. The idea was to counter this by having small mobile surgical units follow the combat units in the field to provide immediate surgery.
At the Normandy invasion, Auxiliary Surgical Groups (ASG) were introduced as forward units of the rear field hospitals. An ASG consisted of two surgeons, an anaesthetist, a nurse and two technicians, operating few kilometres behind the fighting. It paid off well: shorter transport and early surgical treatment dramatically reduced mortality among the wounded.
Immediately following WW2, the ASG concept was enlarged and renamed «Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals» with 60-bed capacity and a larger medical team, fully mobile with their own transport, and could be dismantled ready for transport in six hours, and reassembled in four hours after arrival. The idea was that there should be one MASH per division.
By June 25th 1950, when the Korean War hit a totally unprepared Western world as a bombshell, the MASH concept was untested and other US medical units in Japan had to equip and man three units at very short notice. These arrived in Korea in July-September. The first MASH unit in action was US 8209 MASH, which accompanied US 1st Cavalry Division on July 18th, closely followed by 8225 MASH being added to US 25th Infantry Division, which was already in place. US 8076 MASH followed on 25th July. These three MASH units served the entire UN operation throughout the 1950 campaign.
MASH in action 1952
The rapid withdrawals and advances during the first 13 months – the movements spanned a war theatre extending nearly 1000 kilometres – created enormous transport problems, and the rear field hospitals (at Pusan) were unable to hang on to the advancing units. The MASH units became the only medical units in forward positions, and had to cope with sick and injured in addition to the battle wounded. In order to cope, the MASHs were enlarged, staff was increased and capacity enlarged to 200 beds. The idea of one MASH per division had to be abandoned – the result was one MASH per Corps, serving four divisions.
As the war changed from the fast-moving phase into a trench war, conditions were created which rendered the MASH concept most effective. They were placed as close to the front as possible, just out of enemy artillery range (at that time about 20 kilometres), which meant 10-15 km behind the trenches. By the time NORMASH arrived on the scene in July 1951 it was 60-bed unit with 83 staff, but by October it was increased to the new 200-bed standard with 106 staff.
THE NORWEGIAN CONTRIBUTION
It was the Norwegian Red Cross who initiated what became – in the end – a military field hospital, and they organised the first contingent sent to Korea. Only when the first hospital staff was relieved by contingent no. 2, (October ‘51) – was the responsibility transferred to the Norwegian Army medical branch (FSAN). However, the Norwegian Red Cross continued handling all personnel recruitment during the entire operation 1951-54.
As opposed to the Swedish and Danish contributions – the Swedish hospital in Pusan and the Danish hospital ship Jutlandia at Inchon – both operating far from the actual fighting – the Norwegian field hospital was a unit of the US 8th Army operating in the actual battle zone.
Commencing with contingent no. 2, all Norwegian personnel held US military ranks and wore US uniforms (with US 8th Army insignia), and, even if we were a non-combat unit, all non-medical personnel wore arms at all times.
The United Nations command was very pleased that Norway placed its contingent directly under the command of the US 8th Army. By carrying out its mission in the combat area proper the Norwegian contribution was placed in a class separate from the other contributors of medical support – the nearest comparable was the Indian 60th (Para) Field Ambulance that formed part of 1st Commonwealth Division.
NORMASH
By July 1951 the Norwegian field hospital finally set up its tents – one whole year after the start of the war (10 months after Sweden had set up its hospital in Pusan, and 5 months after the Danish hospital ship ”Jutlandia” anchored outside Pusan). In April, officers from the Norwegian Army medical branch had been in Japan and procured complete equipment for a 60-bed MASH from the US Army for delivery to Korea.
July 13th NORMASH went into active service at Uijongbu, about 20 km nord for Seoul and 16 km behind the front line, as part of US I Corps (Bullseye) as 8055 MASH, to serve the Corps‘ four infantry divisions (60.000 men). It was full speed from the first hour: During its first 40 days, NORMASH received 1048 patients – 23 of them Korean civilians.
During August and September UN advanced further northwards, and October 1st 1951, NORMASH moved 18 km. north to Tongduchon. It was at that point that staff was increased to 106. At the same time it was decided to extend Norway’s participation beyond the first six months, and to transfer the responsibility from the Norwegian Red Cross to the Norwegian Army Medical Service (FSAN).
In June 1952, NORMASH moved a further 3 km northwards, to Habongam-ri, 18 km. south west of the front line, where it was to remain for the rest of the war.
NORMASH Bivouac at Habongam-ri 1952NORMASH Main Gate
INTENSITY
1 Corps’ sector was the westernmost 40 kilometres of the front, from the Han River estuary to Chorwon. It was hotly contested because it blocked the main road to Seoul, only 40 kilometres to the south, which lead to heavy fighting about the strategic points T-bone Hill, Pork Chop Hill, Old Baldy, Little Gibraltar, The Hook and Nevada cities (map page 4).
These fights for the road to Seoul lasted over 20 months and produced a steady stream of wounded for NORMASH. The intensity of the fighting can be illustrated with figures: During the month of June 1953, UN forces fired 2.7 million rounds of artillery. That means 90.000 rounds per day – 63 rounds a minute around the clock. Enemy artillery added to this.
90 000 rounds in a month = one every 30 seconds + plus incoming fire
All the time, as long as we were there, artillery fire was a constant background day and night, the horizon an incessant sea of flames at night. After e few days one got used to it …
The Korean War makes the Gulf Wars and Afghanistan look like Lilliput wars. At July 27th 1953, UN forces counted 934.000 men against North Korea’s and China’s 1.2 million (see Annex B). Except for the Vietnam War (which was not a UN action) the number of casualties of the Korean War completely overshadows all other wars since World War 2.
155 mm Self Propelled Artillery
The UN units lost 197.000 dead and missing (presumed dead) and 558.971 wounded. The number of wounded in the Korean War was the same as the total forces deployed (all branches) in Desert Storm (Iraq) in 1991 (550.000). In Korea, UN lost 54.000 in three years; in Iraq US losses were 5.000 over 8 years. More than two thirds of the UN losses were South Korean – the loss rates of the ROK-divisions were more than double those of the US divisions. The North Korean and Chinese losses were much higher.
The forward positions of the MASH units – close to the combat units – created a highly efficient medical and surgical service, which became even more effective as helicopters were put into use for evacuation of the wounded (even if road transport by ambulance continued to the primary means of evacuation) which saved thousands of lives.
GROUND BREAKING MEDICAL ADVANCES
New methods and means of wound treatment were developed, and the mortality rate among the wounded were halved in comparison to World War 2.(from over 4 % to 2.5 % in Korea), and new surgical methods and procedures reduced the amputation rate dramatically (from 36 % to 13 %). In addition, considerable reductions in the mortality rate from war related diseases such as typhoid, dysentery, hemorrhagic fever etc.
NORMASH Post-Op 1952
Thus, NORMASH personnel became part of ground breaking developments in emergency medical services. The large number of wounded during the Korean War, and the closeness to the scene of fighting, imparted a unique and comprehensive experience in both the treatment of war wounds and in handling large numbers of patients at short notice.
During the development of this report, I had long conversations with Lt. Col. Harald David Meum, who had extensive expeience from Norwegian participation in operations both in Bosnia and in Afghanistan – he informed me that many of the methods and techniques in use today, not only in a military context, but also by emergency services were developed in the heat of battle in Korea.
TRANSPORT OF THE WOUNDED – MEDEVAC
Korean War Ambulance
Road transport by ambulance dominated medevac (medical evacuation)– slow and bumpy even for the short hauls to the nearest MASH. The first two years of the war it was road transport only, even if the static war made for faster and better road transport. By 1952, however, as suitable helicopters became available, use of medevac by air gradually came into use.
H5 Dragonfly unloading wounded at NORMASH 1952
Early in the Korean War, the H-5 Dragonfly was a widely used liaison helicopter. It was not an ambulance, but a system of two outboard stretchers with covers was developed and it saw limited ambulance use. 8076 MASH was the first to receive wounded by helicopter.
1952 saw the arrival of more than 100 of the helicopter type most used in Korea: the H-13G Sioux, a small three-seat bubble (later to be world famous through the TV series MASH).
H-13G Sioux helicopter
The Sioux used one stretcher on each skid, sometimes with a cover, sometimes with just with tied-down blankets – primitive but effective.The versatility of the Sioux – it could land almost anywhere – led to its extensive use for medevac, even if the patients were exposed, limiting it to relatively short flights. .
H-19 Chickasaw helcopter
Finally, in 1953 a considerably larger helicopter came into service: the H-19 Chickasaw, which allowed for medical treatment of the wounded during flight. In ambulance version the Chickasaw could accommodate 8 stretchers and allowed in-flight treatment of patients, a tremendous improvement in medevac.
THE PATIENTS
The losses of the nine UN divisions (apart from ROK losses) during the static war alone (June ’51 – July ‘53) were about 13.000 killed and 50.000 wounded (KIA and WIA only). NORMASH’ mission was to serve the four infantry divisions (60.000 men) that made up I. Corps of the US 8th Army.
At any given time it took 18.000 men to man the 40 km. of trenches that made up I. Corps’ sector of the front, and their activities (mostly night-time patrols) and the artillery and mortar duels resulted in a daily average of 3 killed and 14 wounded plus 3 other injuries (varying greatly from day to day, peaking at 64 surgery patients in 24 hours on July 1st, 1953).
Iron Triangle near Kumwah jJanuary 1953
During NORMASH’ first 737 days –while there was a full scale war going on – we were a military surgical hospital, treating just under 20.000 patients. 12.271 of them were hospitalised (62%), the remaining 7.500 were ”outpatients”, mostly Korean civilians (some of them war wounded). 10.488 of those hospitalised (86%) were sent on to rear hospitals, while 1.706 patients (14%) were released and returned to unit.
During active war, the capacity for treating civilian patients at an active MASH was of course very limited. As combat wounded had priority over all else, civilian patients could not be allowed to reduce capacity. Due to the medical needs of the (limited) local population in the immediate camp area (Tongduchon village), NORMASH’ commanding officer raised this question with the US 8th Army HQ several times; the end result, however, was that the number of civilian day patients at NORMASH (based on my own observations) averaged less than 10 per day up to the armistice (See Table II, and Annex A).
NORMASH’ MILITARY EFFORT
In order to determine NORMASH’ purely military role, one must dig deep. By analysing the available data, combining several sources, adding one’s own experience and some qualified guessing, it is possible to produce a fairly informative picture. The figures become particularly interesting when divided between active war service and post-hostility activities, i.e before and after the armistice July 27th, 1953.
”More than 90.000 patients” is a statement that appears repeatedly in most descriptions of NORMASH. The prominence of this impressive figure is understandable, but has little to do with NORMASH’ real mission. Analyses of the detailed patient statistics show that 8,000 were dental patients, that 70.000 of them were treated after termination of hostilities (July 27th 1953), that 56,000 of them were Korean civilians, and that 95 % of these were ”outpatients” (treatment without hospitalisation)
Subsequent to the armistice becoming effective July 27th, 1953, NORMASH gradually changed character. During the following 448 days – until October 18th, 1954 – NORMASH treated three quarters of the much publicised 90.000 patients, two thirds of them Korean civilians – practically all of them ”outpatients”. Only 5 % (2.554) were hospitalised.
Lowered military readiness requirements led to considerably extended average hospitalisation times to an average of 14.5 days per patient, as opposed to the 3-day limit of the MASH-concept. Very few patients were sent on to other hospitals.
NORMASH became an ordinary hospital: military personnel made up only 31 % of the patients.
US 25th Division bunkers on the lee side of White Horse hill March 1953
COMBAT WOUNDS
5.326 combat wounded were received during the active hostilities period. These made up 55% of all hospitalised patients; a similar number were admitted for other reasons: 20% were identified as ”other injuries” (traffic accidents, work accidents, frostbite, fractures, accidental gunshots, violence etc.), while 25% were identified as ”illnesses”. Most of the illnesses were typically war related, as mentioned above.
”Other injuries” and ”illnesses” made up about 45 % of all those hospitalised before the ceasefire. After the ceasefire, all the hospitalised belonged to this two patient categories. These figures are consistent with official US Army records, which show that 38% of the Korean War losses were not combat related (KIA+ MIA = 33.629); total losses: 54.246.
WHO WERE THE PATIENTS?
A breakdown by nationality shows that patients representing 15 different nations (plus some POWs from North Korea og China) landed on NORMASH’ operating tables, which means nearly all of the participating nations were represented. How could this be, when NORMASH covered less than 25 % of the front line? The explanation lies in the way UN forces were organised.
The core of the UN forces was the 8 divisions of USA plus the Commonwealth Division, and ROKs 12 divisions (about 300.000 men).
These 21 divisions made up five Corps, each of 4 or 5 divisions, covering the 165 kilometre front as follows (West to East): US I.Corps, US IX.Corps, ROK II.Corps, US X.Corps, ROK I.Corps.
All combat units sent by UN member countries were seconded to US divisions – except the ground forces from the nations of the British Commonwealth, who combined to constitute the 1st Commonwealth Infantry Division.
NORMASH served I. Corps’ sector – the western part of the front, from the Han River estuary to just west of Chorwon, about 40 kilometres of frontline. Each Corps would change its component units as divisions were moved about; two divisions, however, were part of I. Corps throughout: Commonwealth Division and ROK 1st Division.
Table I: Secondment of non-US UN contingents to US Army unit (numbers as of July 1953):
Non-US UN contingents seconded to US and Commonwealth Divisions
Country
Contingent (type of unit)
Personnel
Seconded to
UK
2 Inf. brigades +1 tank battalion
14.198
1st Commonw. Inf. Division
Canada
1 Infantry brigade
6.146
1st Commonw. Inf. Division
Australia
1 Infantry regiment (2 battalions)
2.282
1st Commonw. Inf. Division
New Zealand
1 Artillery battallion
1.385
1st Commonw. Inf. Division
India
1 Field ambulance
90
1st Commonw. Inf. Division
Turkey
1 Infantry brigade
5.453
US 2nd Infantry Division .
France
1 Infantry battalion
1.119
US 2nd Infantry Division
Netherland
1 Infantry battalion
819
US 2nd Infantry Division
Ethiopia
1 Infantry battalion
1.271
US 7th Infantry Division
Colombia
1 Infantry battalion
1.068
US 7th Infantry Division
Thailand
1 Infantrt regim. (3 battalions)
2.120
US 25th Infantry Division
Belgium
1 Infantry battalion
900
US 3rd Infantry Division
Luxembourg
1 Infantry platoon
44
Part of the Belgian battalion
Philippines
1 Infantry battalion w/artillery
1.496
US 3rd & 45th Infantry Division
Greece
1 Infantry battalion
1.263
US 1st Cavalry Division
Norway
1 MASH
106
US I. Corps
39.654
Altogether, six other divisions were part of US I. Corps for shorter periods: US 1st Cavalry (1951), US 25th (1951), 1st US Marine Div (1952-53), US 45th (1951-52), US 2nd (1952), US 3rd (1952), US 7th (1953), and US 25th again (1953). Only two US-divisions never formed part of I. Corps during the war : US 24th and US 40th Infantry Div. ROK 9th Div a short time in 1952 – the remaining 10 ROK-divisions all formed part of the other four Corps.
Old Baldy trenches Jan. 1953
Thus, almost all the UN contingents seconded to the US divisions served in the I. Corps sector at one time or another, so their wounded, injured or ill wound up at NORMASH, which explains why the patients represented so many nations.
At the most intensive periods of fighting in the I. Corps sector during the static war – November/December 1952 – the battles for Pork Chop Hill and The Hook – and March 1953, the Pork Chop-Old Baldy and Reno-Carson-Vegas battles, both 2nd Div, 25th Div, 7th Div and Commonwealth Div were involved, and thus Australians, Brits, Canadians, Colombians, Ethiopians, French, Dutch, Thais and Turks.
Totals for the whole war for the same nine divisions (KIA and WIA only, apart from ROK) were 27.619 killed og 103.257 wounded (ROK losses were much higher than for UN units – most data indicate percentages three times higher).
Table II: In-patients at NORMASH 13. July 1951 – 27. July 1953 (737 days)
Besides I. Corps’ ROK-divisions (1st and 9th), IX. Corps had two ROK-divisions (2nd og 9th); X. Corps also had two (12th and 20th) while ROK I. Corps and ROK II. Corps were ROK only (with ROK divisions 6th, 7th, 8th, 11th, 15th, 21st and Capital Division).
Korean Service Corps – unarmed porter who carried food and ammo up and the dead and wounded down
In addition to the regular military forces, there was the Korean Service Corps – more than 50.000 strong – unarmed and on foot, who served the entire front line as porters. They were the ones who carried all supplies on their backs from where the trucks stopped, up the hills, into the trenches – ammunition, food, and all other kinds of stuff up, an d the dead and the wounded down. Their losses are not recorded anywhere.
Korean War Timeline during the 4th NORMASH contingent, October 1952 – May 1953:
Oct. 14-25 1952: The battle for Hill 598 (Sniper Ridge). US 7th Infantry Division defended Kumhwa againstkChnese attacks (the Iron Triangle).
Oct. 26-28, 1952: Battle of the Hook (Commonwealth Division).
Nov. 3, 1952: Chnese attack on Hill 851 (Heartbreak Ridge) held by 2nd Battalion, 160th Infantry Regiment (US 40th Infantry Division)
Dec. 25, 1952: Chinese attack on T-Bone Hill. 38th Infantry Regiment (US 2nd Infantry Division) repulsed the Chinese after hard fighting.
March 17, 1953: Massive Chinese attack on Hill 355 (Little Gibraltar),which was held by 9th Infantry Regiment (US 2nd Infantry Division).
March 23-24, 1953: Chinese attack on Old Baldy/Pork Chop Hill defended by 31st Infantry Regiment (US 7th Infantry Division). Old Baldy was lost (defended by the Colombian battalion) but became no man’s land.
March 26-30, 1953: Massive attacks on outposts Nevada cities (Vegas-Reno-Carson), defended by the 5th Marine Regiment – one Chinese regiment was annihilated.
April 16-18, 1953:Last battle of Pork Chop Hill. 17th and 31st Infantry Regiments (US 7th Infantry Division) suffered heavy losses, but Pork Chop Hill was held.
DAILY LIFE AT NORMASH
As described above, the guard squad of 10, with 40 Korean military police, were responsible for guarding and defending the hospital camp. Many of the MPs were North Koreans who had enlisted in the ROK Army. The hospital camp was in a zone 20 km deep behind the actual front line.
This zone was used by units temporarily in reserve positions, and by many Corps level support units. There were very few civilians in this area, and therefore few communist guerrillas (North Korean troops cut off by the Inchon landing, blending into the local population) which were a real problem further south.
Our perimeter defence consisted of a wide field of barbed wire with numerous trip-flares surrounding the camp. Six guard posts (listening posts at night) were manned by Korean MPs. One Norwegian patrolled the listening posts at night. Our main contact with the war, apart from supervising the ambulance and supply traffic through the main gate, was the incessant thunder of artillery fire.
The TV-series MASH gave a perfect picture of NORMASH: the tents, the mud, the equipment and the atmosphere (excepting Hotlips), even if it falsely leaves the impression that helicopter was the primary transport for the wounded (90 % of all wounded came by road in ambulances), and also features convalescents. There are no convalescents in a MASH – all patients are shipped to the rear within 72 hours after treatment.
The Norwegians who competed for the hotly contested positions at NORMASH: could be divided roughly into three categories by motivation: 1) Idealists eager to save lives, 2) the adventurous, and 3) those with military background who wanted war experience on their records.
The first category quickly engaged in off-duty activities like running a health policlinic for the few civilians still in the area, and became dedicated to that. The other two groups found their way to groups of their own kind among other UN units in the area, and visited the front as often as they got the chance.
Guard duty was not strenuous, but terribly monotonous: The routine was two hours guard duty/six hours off for nine days, the tenth day was off duty for 24 hours midnight to midnight. The monotony was broken each time heavy fighting broke out at the front in our sector (such as when Old Baldy changed hands twice in two days) – that was always followed by a rush of wounded, overfilling pre-op, and every hand available was called on to empty the ambulances and move the wounded around.
The bright side of life was he Sergeant’s Club – every night the NCO mess tent was turned into a bar, open 1800 to midnight, with very reasonably priced drinks (money was Scrips only – US military money). Personnel carrying weapons were not served, and as all non-medical personnel carried arms at all times, a table was set up in a corner of the tent for them to leave their weapons.
The Club was open to all UN personnel, including those from units camped in the neighborhood. As the word spread around, interpretation of ”neighborhood” became quite liberal, and produced visitors from all kinds of surrounding units, giving us an insight into the enormous machinery that constitutes a modern army – all kinds of specialist units: water supply, solid waste, road repair, vehicle recovery, mail etc., even corpse identification units.
About every six weeks, Ist. Corps front line units switched into standby positions behind the front line proper. They quickly found out about NORMASH’ Club and were allowed in as guests of one of the guards. A couple of times when one of 1st US Marine Division’s battalions camped in the vicinity, their bad manners led to incidents requiring us to close the gates, which created stress – and sometimes gunfire.
Because the Commonwealth Division was part of I. Corps and thus in the sector we served, Australians and Brits were frequent guests: 1st Battalion Royal Australian Regiment og 1st Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment, which resulted in frequent contact between their personnel and us Norwegians – a reciprocal affinity that is a well known phenomenon.
These visits went both ways, and opened up an almost fee access for us to the front line in the Commonwealth Division sector, including the forward outposts. This we used on our days off – we hitchhiked up to the front to visit our fiends there.
Final Remark: Norwegian personnel made a great effort for civilian Koreans, but that should not be allowed to overshadow the fact that that Norway’s participation in the Korean War was a MILITARY effort. A large majority of the hospital’s activities after the armistice of July1953 was treatment of civilian patients.
Should any doubt remain as to the nature of NORMASH’ role in the Korean War, it should be removed permanently by the text that accompanied the United States’ unit decoration The Meritorious Unit Commendation which was awarded to NORMASH twice: For the period July 1951 to Jul 1952 and again for the period July 1952 to July 1953:
“The Meritorious Unit Commendation is awarded by the United States to military units for exceptionally meritorious conduct in performance of outstanding services for at least six continuous months during military operations against an armed enemy. The services must be directly related to the combat effort.”
In addition, NORMASH was awarded The Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation. This decoration is issued by the government of South Korea to both Korean and foreign military units “for exceptionally outstanding performance of duty in action against an armed enemy.“
The Big Cheat: The 1988 Nobel Peace Prize
When industrial magnate Alfred Nobel instituted his series of prizes (administered by the Swedish Academy) he separated out the Peace Prize, and entrusted its administration to Norway’s parliament, the Storting. The Storting appoints the five member of the Norwegian Nobel Prize Committe, usually three previous politicians and two cultural personalities.
In 1988, the Norwegian Nobel Prize Committee decided to award its prize for 1988 to “the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces”, a decision that was widely applauded, at least until the fine print became apparent with the text of the award speech, which had been carefully worded to exclude UN action in Korea in 1950-53:
“The original United Nations treaty does mention the possibility of military involvement on the part of the United Nations in the event of hostilities, but, because of the relationship between the great powers, it has never been possible to make use of this part of the treaty – the possible exception being the action in Korea in 1950.
… peace keeping operations were commenced in 1956 (…) in connection with the Suez crisis. The Security Council was unable to act because of a veto from two of the member states. This was solved by summoning the UN General Assembly to a special session, which passed the «Uniting for Peace» resolution that gives the United Nations’ General Assembly the power to intervene in the event of the Security Council being unable to act. This resolution was used to deploy a peacekeeping force …”
The “possible exception” referred to happens to be the only time that UN Security Council – UN’s highest operational authority – actually did approve a military action as the Treaty permitted. It so happened that “the relationship between the great powers” at the time prevented a Soviet veto (see footnote 1, page 2).
So, in 1988, the Nobel Committee chose, as the starting point for “UN Peacekeeping Forces”,a clever paper manoeuvre that permitted the bypassing of the Security Council in 1956, rather than the legal, straightforward decision of 1950. That way, they managed to exclude a previous legal UN action that cost 34,000 (non-Korean) UN forces’ lives. Which proves that today, most people (particularly politicians) like to appear in a humanitarian role rather than in a military one.
How did I get into this war?
On the 25th of June 1950 I had just signed on the Norwegian merchant ship M/S ”Høegh Silverbeam” in Australia, when the news came over the ship’s radio: North Korea had launched a full scale attack on South Korea. I was 19, only five years had passed since World War 2 – World War 3 seemed to be just around the corner. Little did I realise at that moment that just two years hence, I would be in the middle of the Korean War.
Before that, however, I visied Italy and Spain for a year, then I did my national service in the Engineer Regiment, serving in the Norwegian 521 Brigade in Schleswig-Holstein, part of the British Army of the Rhine in occupied Germany. When that service neared its end in the autumn of 1952, a circular arrived, offering enlistment for service with the Norwegian field hospital in Korea.
Hitchiking to the font – Kumwah March 1953
It was well paid: 6000 kroner guaranteed in the bank for 6 months of service – nearly a year’s wages at that time – here was a potential study financing. The competition was stiff – nearly 1000 applicants fought for 106 positions. The recommendation from my CO in Germany, experience from working abroad and language qualifications got me in.
A lifetime later, I see clearly that my half-year in Korea shaped me in more senses than one. It is impossible to imagine what war really is – unless you have been in it yourself. No movie, no TV can impart that experience. You must be there, inside it. Reality etches it into your memory.
When you are in the middle of it, it hits you in the gut – it is war: guns roar, people die, there is no way out. You are a tiny, tiny wheel in a gigantic machine: An army on war footing, with death and destruction as it purpose, with its own rules and laws.
Only the incredible adaptability of the human mind makes it possible to remain sane. Once you do get out, the experience remains with you forever.
ANNEX A
Note on the organisation of US Army units in 1952.
For the guidance of those who are not familiar with military organisation models of 60 years ago, I add the following informative note:
The size and composition of the various ground forces of the US 8th Army in Korea largely followed the lines of World War 2. Units at each level normally comprised 3 identical elements (subunits) plus staff personnel and/or support unit(s). Basically, infantry units were composed as follows (personnel numbers are approximate):
Squad: 8 riflemen plus one machinegun (2 men): Total 10.
Platoon: 3 rifle squads plus staff (8): Total 38.
Company:3 rifle platoons plus staff/support (30): Total 150.
Battalion: 3 rifle companies plus one weapons company (130) plus support company plus staff (120): Total 700.
Regiment: 3 battalions plus one support battalion (600) plus staff (300): Total 3,000.
Division: 3 infantry regiments plus one artillery regiment (2000), one engineer regiment (2000), one signals regiment (1500). one transport regiment (2500), medical staff (500), plus division staff (200): Total 18,000.
The infantry Squad is the smallest unit of infantry, commanded by a corporal or a sergeant. Named numerically (1st squad, 2nd squad, 3rd squad)
An infantry Platoon of three rifle squads plus staff is commanded by a lieutenant with a 2nd lieutenant as 2iC. Named numerically (1st platoon, 2nd platoon etc.)
An infantry Company of three rifle platoons plus a weapons platoon (mortars, medium machine guns and light anti-tank weapons) plus staff is commanded by a Captain with 1st lieutenant as 2iC. Named alphabetically (A company, B company, etc).
An infantry Battalion of three rifle companies plus one heavy weapons company (D-) with heavy mortars, recoilless guns, heavy machine guns, anti-tank guns plus one support company (E-) of engineers, signals, medics and transport, plus staff, is commanded by a Lt. colonel with a Major as 2iC. Battalions are numbered numerically 1stBn, 2nd Bn, 3rd Bn.
The next larger unit might be one of two types:
1) A Regiment of 3 battalions plus additional regiment-level units of engineers, armour (tanks), artillery, signals and division staff commended by a Colonel. Three regiments would form a Division commanded by a Major General (total 18,000-20,000) .
2) A Brigade of 3 battalions with additional company- or battalion-size units of engineers, armour (tanks), artillery and signals (sometimes called Regimental Combat Teams – RCT) commanded by a Colonel, comprising 4,000 – 5,000 men. Three such Brigades would form a Division (total 12,000-15,000).
The difference between a Division with a Regiment structure and one with a Brigade structure is that a Division of Regiments would operate only as a complete Division, while Divisions of Brigades would be able to let their component Brigades (or RCTs) operate as independent units. In the Korean War the Regimental system was predominant.
In very large theatres of war, such as World War 2 (and the Korean War) most armed forces subordinate their Divisions to one further level: Corps (numbered by Roman numerals (I, II, III)
Each Corps would comprise three to five Divisions, their role being to provide support at levels above and beyond the Division-level capabilities, such as heavy artillery, anti-aircraft defences, logistics, transport systems, medical services (the MASH were typical Corps-level support – one MASH for each Corps).
Corps also provide other advanced heavy support, such as running civil utilities like water supply, waste management, electric power, railway systems, maintaining roads and bridges, communications (telephone systems and public broadcasting) etc., as well as organising the supply needs of its component divisions.
Three Corps plus additional administrative and command units would form an Army.
The UN side of the Korean War was organised with five Corps. The composition of each Corps varied over time as divisions were rotated and exchanged, and some Corps comprised both US and ROK divisions. At the time of the armistice (July 1953), the five Corps of the UN army were composed as follows:
I Corps (US): 1st US Marine Div., Commonwealth Div., 7th US Div., ROK 1st and ROK 9th Div. (5 divisions)
IX Corps (US): 25th US Div., ROK 2nd, ROK 7th Div.(3 Divisions)
X Corps (US): 40th US Div, 45th US Div, ROK 12th Div, ROK 20th (4 Divisions)
ROK I Corps: ROK 6th Div, 8th Div and 11th (3 Divisions)
ROK II Corps: ROK 15th Div, 21st and Capital Div. (3 Divisions)
The three US Corps constituted the US 8th Army.
The two ROK Corps constituted the ROK Army.
ANNEX B
NORMASH PATIENT DATA
Total
Before the armistice
After the armistice
All patients
90,000*
27,201
62,799
*Undocumented
Dental patients
8,000
4,000
4,000
Estimated
All patients ex dental.
82,000
19,701
62,299
Calculated
Military patients
26,030
12,201
13,829
Calculated
Civilian patients
55,970
7,500*
48,470
* Estimated
Hospitalised
14,755*
12,201
2,554
*Documented
Combat wounds
5,326*
5,326
0
* Documented
Other injuries
4,086*
2,492
1,594
* Documented
Diseases
4,998*
3,048
1,950
* Documented
Died at the MASH
150*
150
0
* Documented
Released for service
4,314*
1,760
2,554
* Documented
Transferred to other hospitals
10,488*
10,488
0
* Documented
Unregistered*
345*
0
345
* Documented
Days in action
1,185
737
448
Calculated
Mil. patients per day
22
17
31
Calculated
Civ.patients per day
47
10
108
Calculated
69
27
139
Calculated
Hospitalised, %
18.0%
61.9%
4.1%
Calculated
Hospital days*
73,637*
36,603*
37,034*
* Documented
Hospital days per patient
5.0
3.0
14.5
Calculated
Documented data are from dr. Bernh. Paus’ report, FSAN 1955. Undocumented figures are estimates and calculations by the author of this report
